# DIVINE DIALOGUES,

Containing

## DISQUISITIONS

Concerning the

# ATTRIBUTES

AND

# PROVIDENCE of GOD.

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IN THREE VOLUMES.

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By *HENRY MORE*, D. D.

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Thy wiſdom, O Lord, reacheth from one end to another mightily; and ſweetly doth ſhe order all things. *Wiſdom* viii. 1.

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*GLASGOW*,

Printed by ROBERT FOULIS, and ſold by him there; at *Edinburgh*, by Meſſ. HAMILTON and BALFOUR, and JOHN PATON. MDCCXLIII.

BRITISH MUSEUM

# The EDITOR to the READER.

*THE high reputation Dr.* HENRY MORE *obtained for eminent learning and piety, in that religious age in which he flouriſhed, gave the editor ground to hope, that this new edition of his* Divine Dialogues *would be very acceptable to the better ſort of readers in this age, and could give offence to none. He was juſtly renowned for great piety, and purity of manners, during the whole courſe of his life. He was fellow of Chriſt's College in* Cambridge *during the civil wars, and after the reſtoration: and his works continued in ſuch high reputation, long after his deceaſe, that certain gentlemen of great piety and liberality generouſly contributed to have a collection of his Theological and Philoſophical works tranſlated into* Engliſh, *and printed in two volumes in folio, in the reign of Queen* ANNE; *and were thought to have by this means done great ſervice to religion. His Dialogues are deemed not inferior to any of his works, either in the goodneſs of the*

*deſign, or the juſtneſs of reaſoning, or the pleaſantry of the compoſition.*

*The deſign is to eſtabliſh the grand foundations of all religion, the being, and moral perfections of* GOD, *and to vindicate his Providence in the permiſſion of evil natural and moral. The reaſonings are much the ſame with thoſe inſiſted on by the greateſt authors, both ancient and modern; and the agreeable manner of delivering them is in a very natural dialogue, managed by a variety of characters, very well maintained thro' the whole converſation; mixed with abundant humour and pleaſantry, ſuch as, however now a little antiquated, will pleaſe all that can reliſh the manners of other ages as well as their own, and have ſome other ſtandard of politeneſs than the uſual chat and wit of our modern drawing-rooms, coffee-houſes, or play-houſes. 'Tis enough to juſtify the editor, that our author is never mentioned without expreſſions of eſteem and reverence by men of piety and learning, in their defences of religion and virtue; and that even the ingenious Earl of*

Shafts-

Shaftsbury *has done the higheſt honour to this author's* Enchiridion Ethicum, *or, his* Summary of Morals.

*As to ſuch readers who are acquainted with the controverſies of the learned, no apology is neceſſary for any part of theſe dialogues: they know the indulgence due to inquiſitive minds, in their peculiar ſentiments about ſome abſtruſe metaphyſical queſtions relating to the immenſity and eternity of* God: *and that no meaner names than Sir* Iſaac Newton *and* Dr. Clarke *ſeem to have embraced the ſame ſentiments with* Dr. More; *nor will ſuch readers be ſurprized, that, in the infancy of true natural philoſophy among us in* Britain, *there are ſome reaſonings of our author's not concluſive againſt the whimſical fictions of* Carteſius. *Few men of that age knew more of theſe things than our author; but the honour of grand improvements in natural knowledge was reſerved by Providence to the ſubſequent generation.*

*As to other readers of good judgment, if they can excuſe ſome little difficulties*

*ficulties of metaphyſicks in the firſt dialogue, they will find interſperſed ſome beautiful juſt reaſonings, eaſy to be apprehended; and, in the ſecond and third dialogues, 'tis hoped, they will find abundant pleaſure and entertainment, as well as uſeful inſtruction. They will eaſily ſee the conſtant friendly intention toward Chriſtianity, to warn men againſt the corruptions, depravations, and abuſes of that divine inſtitution, and to remove, as far as 'tis poſſible for our weak underſtandings, the objections which have given the greateſt perplexity to inquiſitive and ſerious minds in all ages.*

*To ſome editions of theſe three dialogues, a fourth and fifth are ſubjoined; but, as theſe were ſeparately publiſhed by the author, and are upon ſubjects quite different,* viz. *the explication of ſome obſcure parts of the prophetick books, particularly, the* Revelation; *it was not thought proper to ſubjoin them. The editor ſincerely wiſhes theſe dialogues he has re-publiſhed may continue to ſerve the pious and worthy intention of the author, in promoting true* RELIGION *and* VIRTUE.

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## The proper CHARACTERS of the PERSONS in the enſuing DIALOGUES, with ſome alluſion ro their NAMES.

PHILOTHEUS, A zealous and ſincere lover of God and *Chriſt*, and of the whole Creation.

BATHYNOUS, The deeply-thoughtful or profoundly thinking man.

SOPHRON, The ſober and wary man.

PHILOPOLIS, The pious and loyal Politician.

EUISTOR, A man of criticiſm, philology, and hiſtory.

HYLOBARES, A young, witty, and well moralized Materialiſt.

CUPHOPHRON, A zealous, but airy minded, Platoniſt or Carteſian.

# DIALOGUES

CONCERNING THE

# ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,

AND

# PROVIDENCE.

## DIALOGUE I.

PHILOTHEUS, BATHYNOUS, SOPHRON, PHILOPOLIS, EUISTOR, HYLOBARES, CUPHOPHRON.

I. The preference of Virtue and assurance of an happy Immortality before the pleasures and grandeur of this present world.

*Cuph.* THRICE welcome, O Philotheus, who have brought along with you two such desirable associates as Bathynous and Sophron. Will you please to make a step up into the garden?

*Philoth.* With all our hearts. There is nothing more pleasant these summer-evenings than the cool open air. And I'll assure you it is very fresh here, and the prospect very delightsome.

*Cuph.* Methinks I envy greatneſs for nothing ſo much as their magnificent houſes, and their large gardens and walks, their quarters contrived into elegant knots adorned with the moſt beautiful flowers, their fountains, caſcades and ſtatues; that I might be in a more ſplendid capacity of entertaining my friends. This would be to me no ſmall prelibation of the joys of paradiſe here upon earth.

*Philoth.* For my part, Cuphophron, I think he need envy no-body who has his heart full fraught with the love of God, and his mind eſtabliſhed in a firm belief of that unſpeakable happineſs that the virtuous and pious ſoul enjoys in the other ſtate amongſt *the ſpirits of juſt men made perfect.* The firm belief of this in an innocent ſoul is ſo high a prelibation of thoſe eternal joys, that it equalizes ſuch an one's happineſs, if he have but the ordinary conveniences of life, to that of the greateſt potentates. Their difference in external fortune is as little conſiderable as a ſemidiameter of the earth in two meaſures of the higheſt heaven, the one taken from the ſurface of the earth, the other from its center: the diſproportion you know is juſt nothing.

*Cuph.* It is ſo.

*Philoth.*

*Philoth.* And for gratifying your friends; they that are in a capacity of being truly ſuch, are as fully well-ſatisfy'd with your ordinary entertainment, as if you were maſter of the fortunes of princes. Beſides that it would be hazardous to yourſelf to live in that affected ſplendour you ſpeak of, as it is not altogether ſafe to affect it. For both the deſire and enjoyment of external pomp does naturally blind the eyes of the mind, and attempts the ſtifling of her higher and more heavenly operations, engages the thoughts here below, and hinders thoſe meditations that carry the ſoul to an anticipatory view of thoſe eternal glories above.

*Cuph.* What you ſay, Philotheus, may be, and may not be: theſe things are as they are uſed. But I muſt confeſs I think worldly fortunes are moſt frequently abuſed, and that there is a danger in them: which makes me the more contented with the ſtate I am in.

*Philoth.* And ſo you well may be, Cuphophron: for tho' you will not admit you live ſplendidly, yet it cannot be denied but that you live neatly and elegantly. For ſuch are the beds and alleys of this little ſpot of ground: and ſuch alſo that arbour, if the inſide be as neat as the outſide.

*Cuph.* That you may quickly ſee, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* All very handſome, table, cuſhions, ſeats and all.

II. The deſcription of Hylobares his genius, and of Cuphophron's entertainments in his philoſophical bowre.

*Cuph.* Here I love to entertain my friends with a frugal collation, a cup of wine, a diſh of fruit and a manchet: the reſt they make up with free diſcourſes in philoſophy. And this will prove your greateſt entertainment now, Philotheus, if Philopolis, Euiſtor and Hylobares were come.

*Sophr.* No entertainment better anywhere than a frugal table, and free and ingenuous diſcourſe. But I pray you, Cuphophron, who is that Hylobares? Is it he who is ſo much famed for holding, That there is *nothing* but *body* or *matter* in the world; that there is *nothing juſt* or *unjuſt* in its own nature; That all pleaſures are alike honeſt, tho' it be never ſo unaccountable a ſatisfaction of either a man's cruelty or his luſt?

*Cuph.* O no, it is not he. For I verily believe I know who you mean, tho' it never was yet my fortune to be in his company, and I leaſt of all deſire it now. For he is a perſon very inconverſable, and, as they ſay,

ſay, an imperious dictator of the principles of vice, and impatient of all diſpute and contradiction. But this Hylobares is quite of another genius and extraction; one that is as great a *moraliſt* on this ſide rigour and ſeverity of life, as he is a *materialiſt*, and of a kind and friendly nature.

*Bath.* That is not incredible: for I ſee no reaſon why a ſoul that is infortunately immerſed into this material or corporeal diſpenſation may not in the main be as ſolid a *moraliſt* as a *mathematician*. For the chief points of *morality* are no leſs demonſtrable than *mathematicks*; nor is the ſubtilty greater *in moral* theorems than in *mathematical*.

*Sophr.* In my mind it is a ſign of a great deal of natural integrity and inbred nobleneſs of ſpirit, that maugre the heavineſs of his complexion that thus ſtrongly bears him down from apprehending ſo concerning *metaphyſical* truths, yet he retains ſo vivid reſentments of the more ſolid *morality*.

*Philoth.* That will redound to his greater joy and happineſs, whenever it ſhall pleaſe God to recover his ſoul into a clearer knowledge of himſelf. For even *moral honeſty* itſelf is part of the law of God, and an adumbration of the *divine life*. So that when regeneration has more throughly il-

*Cuph.* That you may quickly ſee, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* All very handſome, table, cuſhions, ſeats and all.

II. The deſcription of Hylobares his genius, and of Cuphophron's entertainments in his philoſophical bowre.

*Cuph.* Here I love to entertain my friends with a frugal collation, a cup of wine, a diſh of fruit and a manchet: the reſt they make up with free diſcourſes in philoſophy. And this will prove your greateſt entertainment now, Philotheus, if Philopolis, Euiſtor and Hylobares were come.

*Sophr.* No entertainment better anywhere than a frugal table, and free and ingenuous diſcourſe. But I pray you, Cuphophron, who is that Hylobares? Is it he who is ſo much famed for holding, That there is *nothing* but *body* or *matter* in the world; that there is *nothing juſt* or *unjuſt* in its own nature; That all pleaſures are alike honeſt, tho' it be never ſo unaccountable a ſatisfaction of either a man's cruelty or his luſt?

*Cuph.* O no, it is not he. For I verily believe I know who you mean, tho' it never was yet my fortune to be in his company, and I leaſt of all deſire it now. For he is a perſon very inconverſable, and, as they ſay,

ſay, an imperious dictator of the principles of vice, and impatient of all diſpute and contradiction. But this Hylobares is quite of another genius and extraction; one that is as great a *moraliſt* on this ſide rigour and ſeverity of life, as he is a *materialiſt*, and of a kind and friendly nature.

*Bath.* That is not incredible: for I ſee no reaſon why a ſoul that is infortunately immerſed into this material or corporeal diſpenſation may not in the main be as ſolid a *moraliſt* as a *mathematician*. For the chief points of *morality* are no leſs demonſtrable than *mathematicks*; nor is the ſubtilty greater *in moral* theorems than in *mathematical*.

*Sophr.* In my mind it is a ſign of a great deal of natural integrity and inbred nobleneſs of ſpirit, that maugre the heavineſs of his complexion that thus ſtrongly bears him down from apprehending ſo concerning *metaphyſical* truths, yet he retains ſo vivid reſentments of the more ſolid *morality*.

*Philoth.* That will redound to his greater joy and happineſs, whenever it ſhall pleaſe God to recover his ſoul into a clearer knowledge of himſelf. For even *moral honeſty* itſelf is part of the law of God, and an adumbration of the *divine life*. So that when regeneration has more throughly illuminated

luminated his underſtanding, I doubt not but that he will fall into that pious admiration and ſpeech of the ancient Patriarch, * *Verily God was in this place, and I knew it not.* Wherefore thoſe that are the true lovers of God muſt be friendly and lovingly diſpoſed towards all his appearances, and bid a kind welcome to the firſt dawnings of that diviner light.

*Cuph.* But beſides the goodneſs of his diſpoſition, he has a very ſmart wit, and is a very ſhrewd diſputant in thoſe points himſelf ſeems moſt puzzled in, and is therein very dexterous in puzzling others, if they be not through-paced ſpeculators in thoſe great theories.

*Sophr.* If he have ſo much wit added to his ſincerity, his caſe is the more hopeful.

*Cuph.* What he has of either, you will now ſuddenly have the opportunity to experience yourſelves: for I ſee Philopolis and the reſt coming up into the garden. I will meet them, and bring them to you. Gentlemen, you are all three welcome at once, but moſt of all Philopolis, as being the greateſt ſtranger.

*Philop.* I pray you, Cuphophron, is Philotheus and the reſt of his company come?

*Cuph.* That you ſhall ſtraightway ſee, when you come to the arbour.

* Gen. xxviii. 16.

*Philop.* Gentlemen, we are very well met. I am afraid we have made you ſtay for us.

*Philoth.* It was more fitting that we ſhould ſtay for Philopolis, than he for us. But we have been here but a little while.

*Cuph.* A very little while indeed; but now our company is doubled, ſo little will be twice as little again. I am very much tranſported to ſee my little arbour ſtored with ſuch choice gueſts. But that mine own worthleſneſs ſpoils the conceit, I could think our company parallel to the ſeven wiſe men of Greece.

*Hyl.* I warrant the *Septenary* will be henceforth much more ſacred to Cuphophron for this day's meeting.

*Cuph.* The *Senary* at leaſt.

*Hyl.* You are ſo tranſported with the pleaſure of the preſence of your friends, O Cuphophron, that you forget to tell me how welcome they are.

*Cuph.* That is ſoon recounted. I ſent into my arbour juſt before Philotheus came this diſh of fruit, and this wine, the beſt, I hope, in all Athens; and I begin to Philopolis, and bid you now all welcome at once.

*Hyl.* You was very early in your proviſion, Cuphophron.

*Cuph.*

*Cuph.* I did early provide for our privacy, that there might be no need of anybody's coming here but ourſelves.

*Hyl.* A large entertainment.

*Cuph.* I keep touch both with my promiſe to Philopolis and with my own uſual frugality in theſe kind of collations: and yet, Hylobares, you have no cauſe to complain; you have to gratify all your five ſenſes. Here is another glaſs; taſte this wine.

*Hyl.* It is very good, Cuphophron, and has an excellent flavour.

*Cuph.* There's to gatify your taſte then, Hylobares, beſides the delicacy of theſe ripe fruit, which recreate alſo the noſtrils with their aromatick ſcent; as alſo does the ſweet ſmell of the eglantines and honey-ſuckles that cover my arbour.

*Hyl.* But what is there to gratify the touch, Cuphophron?

*Cuph.* Is there any-thing more delicious to the touch than the ſoft, cool evening-air, that fans itſelf through the leaves of the arbour, and cools our blood, which youth and the ſeaſon of the year have overmuch heated?

*Hyl.* Nothing that I know of; nor anything more pleaſant to the ſight than the faces of ſo many ingenuous friends met together

together, whoſe candour and faithfulneſs is conſpicuous in their very eyes and countenances.

*Cuph.* Shame take you, Hylobares, you have prevented me: it is the very conceit and due complement I was ready to utter and beſtow upon this excellent company.

*Hyl.* It ſeems good wits jump, and mine the nimbler of the two. But what have you to gratify the ear, Cuphophron?

*Cuph.* Do you not hear the pleaſant notes of the birds both in the garden and on the bowre? and if you think meanly of this muſick, I pray you give us a caſt of your ſkill, and play us a leſſon on your flagellet.

*Hyl.* Upon condition you will dance to it.

*Sophr.* I dare ſay Philopolis thinks us Athenians very merry ſouls.

*Philop.* Mirth and chearfulneſs, O Sophron, are but the due reward of innocency of life; which, if any-where, I believe, is to be found in your manner of living, who do not quit the world out of any *hypocriſy*, *ſullenneſs*, or *ſuperſtition*, but out of a ſincere love of true knowledge and virtue. But as for the pretty warbling of the birds, or that greater ſkill of Hylobares on the flagellet, I muſt take the liberty to profeſs, that it is not that kind of

muſick

muſick that will gain my attention at this time, when I ſee ſo many able and knowing perſons met together; but the purſuance of ſome inſtructive argument freely and indifferently managed for the finding out of the truth. Nothing ſo muſical to my ears as this.

*Cuph.* Nor, I dare ſay, to any of this company, Philopolis.

*Philop.* But I am the more eager, becauſe I would not loſe ſo excellent an opportunity of improving my knowledge. For I never met with the like advantage before, nor am likely again to meet with it, unleſs I meet with the ſame company.

*Cuph.* We are much obliged to you for your good opinion of us, Philopolis. But you full little think that you muſt be the beginner of the diſcourſe yourſelf.

III. Philopolis his queries touching the kingdom of God, together with his ſincere purpoſe of propoſing them.

*Phil.* Why ſo, Cuphophron?

*Cuph.* For it is an ancient and unalterable cuſtom of this place, that in our philoſophical meetings he that is the greateſt ſtranger muſt propound the argument. Whether this cuſtom was begun by our anceſtors out of an ambition of ſhewing their extemporary ability of ſpeaking upon any ſubject,

ſubject, or whether out of mere civility to the ſtranger, I know not.

*Philop.* I believe it was the latter, I am ſo ſenſible of the advantage thereof, and do not only embrace, but, if need were, ſhould claim the privilege, now I know it; but ſhall uſe it with that modeſty, as to excuſe the choice of my argument, if it ſhall appear rather a point of religion than philoſophy. For religion is the intereſt of all, but philoſophy of thoſe only that are at leiſure, and vacant from the affairs of the world.

*Philoth.* Let not that trouble you Philopolis: for, for my part, I look upon the Chriſtian religion rightly underſtood to be the deepeſt and the choiceſt piece of philoſophy that is.

*Philop.* I am glad to hear you ſay ſo, Philotheus; for then I hope the argument I ſhall pitch upon will not appear over-unſuitable. It is touching the kingdom of God.

*Cuph.* Philopolis hath both gratify'd Philotheus, and moſt exquiſitely fitted himſelf in the choice of his argument, his genius and affairs being ſo notedly political. It muſt be a very comprehenſive argument, in which *religion*, *philoſophy* and *policy* do ſo plainly conſpire.

*Philoth.*

*Philoth.* It muſt, indeed. But what are the *Queries* you would propoſe touching the kingdom of God, O Philopolis?

*Philop.* They are chiefly theſe. Firſt, *What the kingdom of God is.* Secondly, *When it began, and where it has been or is now to be found.* Thirdly, *What progreſs it hath made hitherto in the world.* Laſtly, *What ſucceſs it is likely to have to the end of all things.*

*Philoth.* Theſe are grand queſtions indeed, Philopolis, inſomuch that I am mightily ſurpriſed that ſo weighty and profound *Queries* ſhould come from a perſon that is ſo continually taken up with affairs of the world.

*Cuph.* I dare pawn my life that the noiſe of the *fifth monarchy*, or the late plauſible ſound of *ſetting* Jeſus Chriſt *in his throne*, did firſt excite Philopolis to ſearch after theſe myſteries.

*Philoth.* I am not ſo curious to enquire into the firſt occaſions of Philopolis his ſearch after theſe things, as ſollicitous for what end he now ſo eagerly enquires after them. For it is a great and general error in mankind, that they think all their acquiſitions are of right for themſelves, whether it be power, or riches, or wiſdom, and conceit they are no farther obliged than to fortify

or

or adorn themſelves with them: whenas they are in truth mere *depoſitums*, put into their hands by *providence* for the common good; ſo that it were better they had them not, than not to uſe them faithfully and conſcienciouſly to that end: for they bring the greater ſnare upon their own heads by ſuch acquired abilities, and make themſelves obnoxious to the greater condemnation, unleſs they uſe them, as I ſaid, as the *depoſitums* of God, not to their own pride or luſt, but to the common good of the *church*, of their *prince*, and of their *country*.

*Philop.* I acknowledge that to be exceeding true, Philotheus. And next to thoſe are they obnoxious that craftily decline the acquiſition of any power or knowledge, that they may not run the riſques of fortune in witneſſing to the truth, or aſſiſting the public concern: which hypocriſie I being aware of, am ſo far from being diſcouraged, that my zeal is the more enkindled after important truths, that I may the more faithfully and effectually ſerve God and my prince in my generation, tho' with the hazard of all that I have.

*Euiſt.* Which he has once already more than hazarded in the cauſe of his Sovereign, beſides the hazard of his life in five or ſix

bloody battels. But I hope he will never have the occaſion of running that hazard again.

*Philoth.* O admired Philopolis, you are of a right faithful and upright ſpirit; verily I have not diſcovered more true virtue and nobleneſs, no not in the moſt famous philoſophical ſocieties.

*Philop.* I love to feel myſelf of an expreſs and ſettled judgment and affection in things of the greateſt moment; and nothing, I think, can be of greater than the affairs of the kingdom of God, to know who are more properly and peculiarly his people, that my heart may be joined with them, where-ever they are diſcoverable in the world, and my hand may relieve them to the utmoſt extent of the activity of my narrow ſphere. For it ſeems to me both a very ignoble and tedious condition, to be blown about with every wind of doctrine or tranſitory Intereſt, and not to ſtick to that wherein a man's loſs proveth his greateſt gain, and death itſelf a tranſlation into eternal life and glory.

IV. Hylobares's interpoſal of his queries: Firſt, touching the exiſtence of God, and Divine providence.

*Hyl.* This were an excellent temper in Philopolis indeed, to be thus reſolved, if he

he were ſure not to fall ſhort in his account.

*Sophr.* But ſuppoſe he was not ſure, ſeeing he ventures ſo little for ſo great a ſtake, I think his temper is ſtill very ſingularly excellent and commendable.

*Philoth.* But what needs any ſuch ſuppoſition, O Sophron? for as ſure as there is a God and a providence, ſuch a ſingle-minded ſoul as Philopolis will after this life prove a glorious citizen of heaven.

*Hyl.* I am fully of your opinion, O Philotheus, that Philopolis his future happineſs is as ſure as the exiſtence of God and divine providence. But the aſſurance of theſe has hitherto ſeemed to me very uncertain and obſcure: whence, according to right method, we ſhould clear that point firſt. For there can be no kingdom of God, if God himſelf be not, or if his providence reach not to the government of the univerſe, but things be left to blind chance or fate.

*Philop.* For my part, gentlemen, I could never yet call ſuch truths into doubt, tho' Hylobares has divers times attempted to diſſettle me at my houſe near the other Athens, where ſometimes he gives me the honour of a viſit. But all his reaſonings have ſeemed to me ſophiſtical knots or

tricks

tricks of legerdemain, which tho' they might a little amuſe me, yet they could not move me at all from my ſettled faith in God and his providence.

*Philoth.* So great a firmitude is there in life againſt all the ſubtil attacks of ſhifting reaſon. This farther confirms me in an obſervation I have made a long time ago, *That there is a kind of ſanctity of ſoul and body that is of more efficacy for the receiving or retaining of divine truths than the greateſt pretences to diſcurſive demonſtration.*

*Philop.* But tho' I want nothing to confirm me in theſe points, yet if Philotheus could convince Hylobares of the truth of of them, and beat him at his own weapon, it would be to me a pleaſant ſpectacle; provided he come to my propoſed theme at the laſt.

V. The exiſtence of God argued from the orderly deſigns diſcoverable in the phænomena of Nature.

*Philoth.* It is a great wonder to me that a perſon ſo ingenious as Hylobares, and ſo much converſant in philoſophy, ſhould at all doubt of the exiſtence of the Deity, any more than he does of Philopolis his exiſtence or my own; for we cannot ſo audibly or intelligibly converſe with him as God

God doth with a philoſopher in the ordinary *phænomena* of Nature. For, tell me, O Hylobares, whether if ſo brief a treatiſe as that of *Archimedes de ſphero & cylindro* had been found by chance, with the delineations of all the figures ſuitable for the deſign, and ſhort characters (ſuch as they now uſe in *ſpecious Arithmetick* and *Algebra*) for the ſetting down of the demonſtrations of the orderly-diſpoſed propoſitions, could you or any elſe imagine that the delineating and fitting theſe things together was by chance, and not from a knowing and deſigning principle, I mean from a power intellectual?

*Hyl.* I muſt confeſs I think it in a manner impoſſible that any one that underſtood the purpoſe of thoſe figures and the adnexed demonſtrations ſhould doubt but that the deſcription of them was by ſome intelligent Being.

*Philoth.* But why do you think ſo, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* Becauſe it is the property of that which is intelligent to lay ſeveral things together orderly and advantageouſly for a propoſed deſign. Which is done ſo conſtantly and repeatedly in that treatiſe, and ſo methodically, that it is impoſſible to

doubt but that it is the effect of ſome intellectual agent.

*Philoth.* Wherefore wherever we find frequent and repeated indications of purſuing ſkilfully a deſign, we muſt acknowledge ſome intelligent being the cauſe thereof.

*Hyl.* We muſt ſo.

*Philoth.* But what a ſmall ſcroll and how few inſtances of purſuing a deſign is there in that treatiſe of Archimedes, in compariſon of the whole volume of nature, wherein, as in Archimedes, every leading demonſtration to the main upſhot of all (which is the proportion betwixt the ſphere and cylinder) is a pledge of the wit and reaſon of that mathematician, ſo the ſeveral ſubordinate natures in the world (which are in a manner infinite) bear conſpicuouſly in them a deſign for the beſt, and therefore are a cloud of witneſſes that there is a divine and intellectual principle under all?

VI. Several inſtances of that general argument.

*Hyl.* This is better underſtood by inſtances, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* It is. And I will inſtance in the meaneſt firſt, I mean, in the moſt looſe and general ſtrokes of the ſkill of that great Geometrician, as Plutarch ſomewhere calls the Deity. As in the nature of *gravity*, which

which precipitates thick terreſtrial parts downward through both air and water, without which power no beaſts nor fowls could live upon the earth or in the air, dirt and filth would ſo flow into their mouths and ſtop their breath; nor could fiſhes ſubſiſt in the water. 2. In that ſtrong tug againſt over-much baring the ſubtileſt matter in theſe lower regions, that thinner element being diſproportionated to the lungs of either birds or beaſts; as is to be more fully underſtood in thoſe excellent experiments of the air-pump. 3. In the paralleliſm and the due proportionated inclination of the axis of the earth, and the latitude of the Moon from the æquator.

*Hyl.* I cannot deny but that theſe laws are better than if things had been otherwiſe.

*Philoth.* 4. The contrivance of the earth into hills and ſprings and rivers, into quarries of ſtone and metall: is not all this for the beſt?

*Hyl.* I conceive it is.

*Philoth.* And what think you of land and ſea? whenas all might have been quagmire?

*Hyl.* That alſo is for the beſt. For on it depends the pleaſure and profit of navigation. Beſides that the ſea is the fountain of moiſture that adminiſters to the ſprings under-

underneath, as the ſprings ſupply the rivers above-ground, and ſo imitate the circulation of the blood in man's body.

*Philoth.* Caſt your eye alſo upon the variety of herbs and trees, their beauty, their virtue and manifold uſefulneſs, the contrivance of their ſeed for propagation; and conſider if all be not for the beſt.

*Hyl.* It would require an age to purſue theſe things.

*Philoth.* Well then, let us for brevity's ſake conſider only the ſeveral kinds of animals: which, beſide the uſefulneſs of ſome of them eſpecially and more appropriately to mankind, (as the dog and the horſe for ſervices, ~~and oxen and ſheep for his food~~) their external ſhapes are notoriouſly accommodated to that law or guiſe of life that nature has deſigned them; as in general the birds for flying, the fiſh for ſwimming, and the beaſts for running on the ground; the external frame and covering of their bodies are exquiſitely fitted for theſe purpoſes. Beſides, what alſo is very general, that contrivance of male and female for propagation, and that notable difference of fiſhes and birds being oviparous, that there might be the more full ſupply for that great havock that would be neceſſarily made upon theſe kind of creatures by

by their devouring enemies. To theſe you may add the inſtinct of birds in building their neſts and ſitting on their eggs; the due number and poſition of the organs of ſenſe and peculiar armatures of creatures, with the inſtinct of uſing them: that thoſe fowls that frequent the waters, and only wade, have as well long legs as long necks; and thoſe that are made for ſwimmig have feet like oars: and that no birds have paps, as beaſts have. All which things, and infinite more, do plainly argue the accuracy of deſign in their framing.

*Hyl.* Things are, I muſt confeſs, as if they were plainly deſigned to be ſo.

*Philoth.* But to put an end to theſe inſtances, which, as you ſaid, a whole age would not ſuffice to enumerate; the inward anatomy and uſe of parts in many thouſand kinds of animals is as ſure a demonſtration of a very-curiouſly-contrived deſign in each of theſe animal's bodies, as the ſeveral figures and demonſtrations in the above-named book of Archimedes are of the writer's purpoſe of concluding the truth of each propoſition to which they appertain. That in Man's body is notorious. The fabrick of the eye, its ſafe and uſeful ſituation, the ſuperaddition of muſcles, and the admirable contrivance of the fleſh

of

of the whole body in a manner into that uſeful organization; thoſe of the larynx for ſpeech and ſinging; the induſtrious perforation of the tendons of the ſecond joints both of fingers and toes, and the drawing of the tendons of the third joints through them; the ventricles of the heart and their *valvulæ*, as alſo the *valvulæ* of the veins; the fabrick of theſe, and the apparently-deſigned uſe of them, and of a thouſand more, not only in man, but analogically in the reſt of animals, are as certain a pledge of the exiſtence of a God, as any voice or writing that contains ſuch ſpecimens of reaſon as are in Archimedes his treatiſe are an argument of the exiſtence of ſome man or angel that muſt be the author of them.

*Hyl.* The weight of reaſon and the vehemence of Philotheus his zeal does for the preſent bear me down into this belief whether I will or no. For I eaſily feel the force of his arguing from theſe few hints, having peruſed the lateſt treatiſes of this ſubject, and being ſufficiently verſed in anatomical hiſtory; which, I muſt confeſs, urges upon me, more effectually than any-thing, the exiſtence of God.

*Philoth.* Which belief, methinks, you ſhould never be able to ſtagger in, if you conſider that in theſe infinite kinds of living

ing-creatures, none of them are made fooliſhly or ineptly, no not ſo much as thoſe that are gendered of putrefaction. So that you have infinite examples of a ſteddy and peremptory acting according to ſkill and deſign, and abundant aſſurance that theſe things cannot come to paſs by the fortuitous jumbling of the parts of the matter.

VII. That neceſſary cauſality in the blind matter can do as little toward the orderly effects in nature as the fortuitous jumbles thereof.

*Hyl.* No, Philotheus, they cannot. But tho' they be not the reſults of ſuch fortuitous cauſes, why may they not be the effects of neceſſary ones, I mean, of the neceſſary mechanical law of the motion of matter? As a line proportionally cut, if the greater ſegment ſubtends an *iſoſceles* whoſe *crura* each of them are equal to the whole line, each angle at the *baſis* will *neceſſarily* be double to that of the *vertex*. And this will be the neceſſary property of this triangle.

*Philoth.* But what does this prove, whenas there is no neceſſity in the matter that any line ſhould be ſo cut, or, if it were, that any two lines of equal length with the whole ſhould clap in with the greater ſegment to make ſuch a triangle, much leſs to inſcribe a guinquangle into a circle, or that the

the motion of the matter ſhould frame an exact *icoſaedrum* or *dodecaedrum*, whoſe fabrick much depends on this proportional ſection of a line, as you may ſee in *Euclid*? And yet there is a more multifarious artifice in the ſtructure of the meaneſt animal. I tell thee, Hylobares, there is nothing neceſſarily in matter that looks like an intellectual contrivance. For why ſhould blind neceſſity do more in this kind than fluctuating chance? or what can be the motion of blind neceſſity but peremptory and perpetual fluctuation? No, the neceſſary and immutable property of ſuch a triangle as thou haſt deſcribed, with ſuch a *baſis* and ſuch a *crura*, is in thy own mind or intellect, which cannot but conceive every triangle ſo made to have ſuch a property of angles, becauſe thy mind is the image of the eternal and immutable intellect of God. But the matter is lubricous and fluid, and has no ſuch intellectual and immutable laws in it at all, but is to be guided and governed by that which is intellectual.

*Hyl.* I mean as Carteſius means and profeſſes, that the mechanical Deduction of cauſes in the explication of the *phænomena* of the world is as cloſe and neceſſary as mathematical ſequels.

*Piloth.* Nay, I add farther, that he conceives

ceives his own mechanical deductions to be ſuch. And I muſt confeſs I think they are as much ſuch as any will be; and ſo excellent a wit failing ſo palpably, makes me abundantly confident, that the pretence of ſalving the *phænomena* by mere mechanical principles is a deſign that will never prove ſucceſsful.

VIII. That there is no phænomenon in nature purely mechanical.

*Hyl.* Why? where does Carteſius fail, O Philotheus?

*Philoth.* Nay, rather tell me, O Hylobares, where he does not; or rather inſtance in any one *phænomenon* that is purely mechanical.

*Hyl.* The earth's being carried about in this our *vortex* round the ſun.

*Philoth.* That is very judiciouſly pitched upon, if the *deferent* of the earth, I mean the *vortex*, were the reſult of mere mechanical principles.

*Hyl.* Why? is it not? what can mechanical motion do, if not produce that ſimple *phænomenon* of liquidity?

*Philoth.* The matter of the *vortex* is not ſimple enough, not to need the aſſiſtance of an higher principle to keep it in that conſiſtence it is.

*Hyl.* Why ſo, Philotheus?

*Philoth.* Becauſe *diſunity* is the natural property of matter, which of itſelf is nothing elſe but an infinite congeries of *phyſical monads.*

*Hyl.* I underſtand you, Philotheus. And indeed there is nothing ſo unconceivable to me as the holding together of the parts of matter; which has ſo confounded me when I have more ſeriouſly thought upon it, that I have been prone to conclude with myſelf, that the gimmers of the World hold together not ſo much by *geometry* as ſome natural *magic*, if I knew what it was.

*Philoth.* You may do in due time. But in the mean while it is worth our noting, that there is another great flaw in this moſt hopeful inſtance you produce of pure mechaniſm. For the earth never got into this orbit it is now moved in by virtue of thoſe mechanical laws Carteſius deſcribes, nor is ſtill detained here by them.

*Hyl.* Why not?

*Philoth.* For if the earth had been bandied out of one *vortex* into another, as is ſuppoſed, all that looſer and lighter matter that hung about it had been ſtript from it long before it came hither: (as if a man ſhould fling out of his hand feathers, chaff and a bullet together, the ſolidity of the bullet

bullet will carry it from the chaff and feathers, and leave them behind) and ſo the Matter of the third Region of the earth had been loſt, whereby it had become utterly unhabitable.

*Hyl.* I never thought of this before.

IX. That there is no levitation or gravitation of the æther or of the vulgar elements in their proper places: whence 'tis plain, that matter's motion is moderated from ſome diviner principle.

*Philoth.* And then the deſcending of the earth to this orbit is not upon that mechanical account Carteſius pretends, namely, the ſtrong ſwing of the more ſolid *globuli* that overflow it. For if there were ſuch an actual tug of the *globuli* of the *vortex* from the center toward the circumference, the preſſure would be intolerable, and they would even maſh themſelves and all things elſe a-pieces.

*Hyl.* I am again ſurpriſed, Philotheus, but I muſt ingenuouſly confeſs, I think ſo.

*Philoth.* But there being no ſuch hard preſſure, no *levitation* or *gravitation* (as is alſo manifeſt in the elements vulgarly ſo called) *in locis propriis*, is it not a manifeſt argument that all is not carried according to mechanical neceſſity, but that there is a principle that has a proſpection *for the beſt*, that rules all?

*Hyl.* It is very manifeſt, in that neither the celeſtial matter of the *vortices* nor the air nor water are preſſitant in their proper places, that it is for the beſt; elſe how could any creatures live in the air or water? the weight of theſe elements would preſs them to death.

*Philoth.* Muſt not then ſome diviner principle be at the bottom, that thus cancels the mechanical laws for the common good?

*Hyl.* It ſhould ſeem ſo; and that the motion of matter is not guided by matter, but by ſomething elſe.

*Philoth.* That ſeems very evident from light things that riſe up in water. As for example in a deep bucket of water, where we will ſuppoſe a thin round board forced to the bottom, of almoſt the ſame wideneſs that the bucket is: the water of the bucket we will ſuppoſe ſo heavy, that ſcarce two men ſhall be able to bear it. Now tell me, Hylobares, how this thin board does get to the top, ſo maſſie a weight lying on it. The whole water that lies upon it does actually preſs downward, and therefore rather preſſes it down, than helps it up.

*Hyl.* It may be the weight of the water gets by the ſides under it, and ſo bears it up by its own ſinking.

*Philoth.* That is ingeniouſly attempted,

*Hyl.*

Hylobares. But you must consider that the water that lies upon the board to press it down is, it may be, forty times more than that which you conceive to press betwixt the rim of the round board and the vessel.

X. That the primordials of the world are not mechanical, but vital.

*Hyl.* I am convinced that the rising of the round board is not mechanical. But I pray you deal freely with me, Philotheus, for I perceive you are cunninger than I in that philosophy; has Des-Cartes truly solved no *phænomenon* in nature mechanically?

*Philoth.* He thinks he has solved all mechanically he treats of. But, to deal freely, I find none of his solutions will hold by mere mechanicks: not his formation of suns, stars, nor planets; not the generation nor motion of the magnetick particles; not his hypothesis of the flux and reflux of the sea; not the figure and colours of the rainbow; not the winds, nor clouds, nor rain, nor thunder: neither of these, nor of any other *phænomena*, has he given sufficient mechanical causes. Nay, I will add at once, That that simplest and first hypothesis of his, * That all the matter of the universe was first cast into small parts equal



* Princip. Philos. Part. 3. Sect. 46, 47.

in motion and magnitude, and that hence the ſuns or ſtars and *vortices* aroſe in the diſtinction of the matter (by the mutual fridging of thoſe particles one againſt another) into the firſt and ſecond element, I will add, I ſay, That this firſt original of things is moſt groſly repugnant to the actual proportion of theſe elements one to another. For from this mechanical way, ſo ſtated as he has declared, it will follow, that the ſun overflows the orbit of *ſaturn* no leſs than ten millions four hundred eighty four thouſand ſemidiameters of the earth: which one would think were intimation ſufficient to give us to underſtand, that the *primordials* of the world are not *mechanical*, but *ſpermatical* or *vital*; not made by rubbing and filing and turning and ſhaving, as in a Turner's or Blackſmith's ſhop, but from ſome univerſal principle of inward life and motion containing in it the ſeminal forms of all things, which therefore the *Platoniſts* and *Pythagoreans* call the great λόγος σπερματικὸς of the world.

*Hyl.* This is admirable: and it would be a great pleaſure to me to ſee theſe things made out by reaſon, that I might the more clearly underſtand how much that great wit has fallen ſhort in his account.

*Philop.* I prithee, dear Hylobares, deny thyſelf

thyſelf that pleaſure at this time: for I fear all the time of my abode here in the town will not ſuffice for ſuch a taſk.

*Philoth.* It would, I muſt confeſs, be ſomething too copious a digreſſion.

*Cuph.* And the more needleſs, foraſmuch as it cannot be denied but that Des-Cartes's deductions are not always ſo mathematically or mechanically certain as he took them to be. But however, tho' he fails in his attempt, yet the *mechanical philoſophy* may ſtand firm ſtill. It is not the error of the *art*, but of the *artiſt*.

*Philoth.* But it is a ſhrewd preſumption, O *Cuphophron*, that when ſo tranſcendent a wit as Des-Cartes, and ſo peculiarly mechanical, fails ſo palpably even in the general ſtrokes of nature, of giving any ſuch neceſſary mechanical reaſons of her *phænomena*, it is too palpable a preſumption, I ſay, that the pretence itſelf is raſh and frivolous, and that it is not the true and genuine mode of philoſophizing.

*Philop.* What Philotheus ſays, ſeems to me infinitely credible, tho' I be no pretender to philoſophy.

XI. Inſtances of ſome ſimple phænomena quite contrary to the laws of mechanics.

*Philoth.* But if we produce even among the more general *phænomena* of nature, ſuch

ſuch inſtances as plainly thwart the acknowledged laws of mechanics, let Cuphophron tell me then what will become of his pure and univerſal mechaniſm he pretends to run through the whole frame of the world.

*Cuph.* I will tell you when you have produced them.

*Philoth.* But tell me firſt whether you do not firmly believe the motion of the earth *annual* and *diurnal?*

*Cuph.* I do; and every one elſe I think that has any ſkill in philoſophy.

*Philoth.* Why then, you muſt neceſſarly hold a *vortex* of æthereal matter running round the ſun, which carries the earth about with it.

*Cuph.* I muſt.

*Philoth.* And being ſo great a *mechaniſt* as you are, that the particles that have ſwallowed down the earth thus far into our *vortex*, that even thoſe that are near the earth, ſo many of them as anſwer to the magnitude of the earth, are at leaſt as ſolid as it.

*Cuph.* They are ſo.

*Philoth.* And that therefore they move from the center with a very ſtrong effort.

*Cuph.* They do ſo.

*Philoth.* And ſo do the *vortices* that bear againſt our *vortex.*

*Cuph.*

*Cuph.* No queſtion; or elſe our *vortex* would over-run them, and carry them away with itſelf.

*Philoth.* Do you or any elſe either here or under the line, at mid-day or mid-night, feel any ſuch mighty preſſure as this hypotheſis infers?

*Cuph.* I believe not.

*Philoth.* There is one thruſt at your pure pretended mechaniſm.

*Cuph.* Well, at it again; I will ſee if I can lie at a cloſer ward.

*Philoth.* The *phænomenon* of gravity, is it not perfectly repugnant to that known mechanical principle, That what is moved will continue its motion in a right line, if nothing hinder: whence it will follow, that a bullet flung up into the air muſt never return back to the earth, it being in ſo rapid a motion with that of the earth's.

*Cuph.* I underſtand what you mean; you thruſt at the mechanical philoſophy before, you have now ſhot at it.

*Philoth.* Ay, and hit the mark too, I trow: ſo that it is needleſs to add that of the great weight hanging at the ſucker of the air-pump, and drawn up thereby beyond all the accounts of mechanic philoſophy, with other things of the like nature.

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* I expected these instances of Philotheus, and understand the force of them throughly out of a late † Author, and must ingenuously confess that they seem to me such as contain little less than a demonstration, that all things in nature are not carried on by principles merely mechanical.

*Cuph.* If they be so good, I pray you let us hear some more of them, Philotheus.

*Phil.* When I have heard your answer to these.

*Cuph.* My answer is, O Philotheus, that these instances seem for the present demonstrative and unanswerable; so far Hylobares and I concur. But I hope I may without offence profess that I think the cause of the mechanick philosophy is not therefore quite desperate, but that when our active and searching Wits have made farther enquiry into things, they may find out the pure mechanical causes of that puzzling *phænomenon* of gravity.

*Philoth.* Ay, but Hylobares may take notice, that the Author he mentions does not only confute the false solutions of that *phænomenon*, but demonstrates all mechanical solutions of it impossible, it being so manifestly repugnant to the confessed laws of mechanics. *Hyl.*

† Dr. *More*'s Antidote, lib. 2. ch. 2. Immort. lib. 3. ch. 12, 13.

*Hyl.* It is very true.

*Cuph.* That may ſeem a demonſtration for the preſent, which to poſterity will appear a mere ſophiſtical knot, and they will eaſily ſee to looſe it.

*Bath.* I believe by the help of ſome new improved microſcopes.

XII. The fond and indiſcreet hankering after the impoſſible pretenſions of ſolving all phænomena mechanically, freely and juſtly perſtringed.

*Philop.* Nay but in good earneſt, O Cuphophron, (if you will excuſe my freedom of ſpeech) tho' I have not that competency of judgment in philoſophical matters, yet I cannot but deem you an over-partial mechaniſt, that are ſo devoted to the cauſe, as not to believe demonſtration againſt it, till mechanics be farther improved by poſterity. It is as if one would not believe the firſt book of Euclid, till he had read him all over, and all other mathematical writers beſides. For this *phænomenon* of *gravity* is one of the ſimpleſt that is, as the firſt book of Euclid one of the eaſieſt. Not to add what a blemiſh it is to a perſon, otherwiſe ſo moral and virtuous, to ſeem to have a greater zeal for the oſtentation of the mechanical *wit* of *men*, than for the manifeſtation of the *wiſdom* of *God* in nature.

*Sophr.* Excellently well ſpoken O Philopolis

lopolis. † *As in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man.* You have spoken according to the most inward sense and touch of my very soul concerning this matter. For I have very much wondred at the devotedness of some mens spirits to the pretence of pure mechanism in the solving of the *phænomena* of the universe, who yet otherwise have not been of less pretensions to piety and virtue. Of which mechanic pronity I do not see any good tendency at all. For it looks more like an itch of magnifying their own or other mens wit, than any desire of glorifying God in his wise and benign contrivances in the works of nature, and cuts off the most powerful and most popular arguments for the existence of a Deity, if the rude career of agitated matter would at last necessarily fall into such a structure of things. Indeed if such a mechanical necessity in the nature of matter were really discoverable, there were no help for it: and the Almighty seeks no honour from any man's lie. But their attempts being so frustraneous, and the demonstrations to the contrary so perspicuous, it is a marvel to me, that any men that are virtuously and piously disposed should be so partially and zealously affected in a cause that

† Prov. 27. 19.

that has neither truth nor any honeſt uſefulneſs in it.

*Cuph.* O Sophron, Sophron, full little do you conſider what a wonderful pleaſure it is to ſee the plain mechanical ſequels of cauſes in the explication of the *phænomena* of the world as neceſſarily and cloſely coherent as mathematical demonſtration itſelf.

*Sophr.* Certainly, O Cuphophron, you are much tranſported with the imagination of ſuch fine ſpectacles, that your mere deſire ſhould thus confidently preſent them to you before they are. But for my part, I conceive there is far more pleaſure in clearly and demonſtratively diſcovering that they are not, than there would be if it were diſcoverable that they are. And that way of philoſophizing that preſſes the final cauſe, the τὴν ἄνω ἀρχὴν, as * Ariſtotle calls it, ſeems to me far more pleaſing and delicious than this haughty pretence of diſcovering that the frame of the world owes nothing to the wiſdom of God.

*Bath.* All things muſt out, O Sophron, in the promiſcuous ferments and ebulliencies of the ſpirits of men in this age, that that wiſdom which is the genuine fruit or flower of the *Divine Life* may in ſucceſ-



* *De generat. Animal. lib.* 2.

ſion of time triumph over the moſt ſtrutting attempts or performances of the higheſt *natural wits*.

*Cuph.* What wiſdom is that which flows out of the Divine Life, O Bathynous?

*Bath.* That which leads to it; which the mechanical philoſophy does not, but rather leads from God, or obſtructs the way to him, by preſcinding all pretence of finding his footſteps in the works of the creation, excluding the *final cauſe* of things, and making us believe that all comes to paſs by a blind, but neceſſary, jumble of the matter.

*Cuph.* Well, be the future fate of things what it will, I doubt not but Carteſius will be admired to all poſterity.

*Bath.* Undoubtedly, O Cuphophron; for he will appear to men a perſon of the moſt eminent *wit* and *folly* that ever yet trode the ſtage of this earth.

*Cuph.* Why of *wit* and *folly*, Bathynous?

*Bath.* Of *wit*, for the extraordinary handſom ſemblance he makes of deducing all the *phænomena* he has handled, neceſſarily and mechanically, and for hitting on the more immediate material cauſes of things to a very high probability.

*Cuph.* This at leaſt is true, Bathynous. But why of folly?

*Bath.*

*Bath.* Becauſe he is ſo credulous, as not only to believe that he has neceſſarily and purely mechanically ſolved all the *phænomena* he has treated of in his philoſophy and meteors, but alſo that all things elſe may be ſo ſolved, the bodies of plants and animals not excepted.

*Cuph.* Poſterity will be beſt able to judge of that.

*Philop.* Cuphophron is very conſtantly zealous in the behalf of the mehanic philoſophy, tho' with the hazard of loſing thoſe more notable arguments deducible from the *phænomena* of nature for the proving the exiſtence of a God: and yet I dare ſay he is far from being in the leaſt meaſure ſmutted with the ſoil of atheiſm.

*Cuph.* I hope ſo.

XIII. The exiſtence of God argued from the conſent of nations, from miracles and prophecies, from his works in nature, and from his Idea.

*Philop.* Wherefore, O Cuphophron, let me beg the liberty of aſking you, what other inducements you have to believe there is a God. Is it the authority of the catholick Church? or what is it?

*Cuph.* I have a very venerable reſpect for the Church, O Philopolis, which makes me the more ſorry when I conſider how much they have wronged or defaced their

authority in obtruding things palpably impoſſible, and moſt wretchedly blaſphemous, with equal aſſurance and ſeverity as they do the belief of a God.

*Euiſt.* I conceive Cuphophron reflects upon their barbarous butchering of men for denying the article of *tranſubſtantiation.*

*Cuph.* It may be ſo. Who can believe men upon their own authority that are once deprehended in ſo groſs and impious an impoſture?

*Euiſt.* But theſe are not the Church catholick, but only a ſome-thing-more-numerous faction of men. But not only theſe, but the whole Church, and indeed all nations, believe that there is a God.

*Cuph.* Indeed Tully ſays, *Nulla gens tam barbara*, &c.

*Euiſt.* It is conſent of nations therefore, O Cuphophron, that you chiefly eſtabliſh your belief of a Deity upon.

*Cuph.* That is a plauſible argument, Euiſtor.

*Euiſt.* But the hiſtory of miracles and prophecies, with their completion, a far greater.

*Cuph.* They are very ſtrong arguments that there are *inviſible Powers* that ſuperintend the affairs of mankind, that have a greater virtue and comprehenſion of knowledge than ourſelves. *Bath.*

*Bath.* And ſo may be able to bring to paſs what themſelves predict in long ſucceſſion of ages. As if the government of the world and the affairs of mankind were intruſted into the hands of angels.

*Sophr.* But ſome miracles are ſo great, and predictions of ſo vaſt a compaſs of time, that none but God can rationally be thought to be the author of them.

*Bath.* Moſt aſſuredly God himſelf ſuperintends and acts through all.

*Philop.* Is this then the *baſis* of Cuphophron's belief?

*Cuph.* I will tell you, O Philopolis, becauſe I ſee you ſo hugely deſirous, what is the main philoſophical *baſis* of my belief of a God.

*Philop.* What is it?

*Cuph.* The *innate idea* of God in my mind: the arguings from thence ſeem to me undeniable demonſtrations.

*Philop.* I believe they are the more prevalent with you becauſe they are Des-Cartes'.

*Cuph.* It may be ſo. And they are ſo convictive, that I do very ſecurely diſregard all that other way of arguing from the *phænomena* of nature.

*Philop.* I have read thoſe reaſonings of Des-Cartes, but they ſeem to me hugely

high and metaphyſical, and I meet with many men that look upon them as ſophiſtical; moſt men ſome of them, others all. But it is the privilege of you high and exalted wits to underſtand the force of one another's notions the beſt.

*Cuph.* I muſt confeſs, O Philopolis, there is an extraordinary and peculiar congruity of ſpirit betwixt me and Des-Cartes.

*Philop.* Ay, but we ought to conſult the common good, O Cuphophron, and not decry the more vulgar intelligible arguments, or affect ſuch a philoſophy as will exclude all from laying hold of God but ſuch as can ſoar ſo high as you raiſed wits can. Arguments from the *phænomena* of the world are far more accomodate to a popular underſtanding.

*Cuph.* Wherefore I talk at this rate only in our free philoſophical meetings.

*Philop.* It is diſcreetly done of you.

*Hyl.* Well, *Cuphophron*, you may hug yourſelf in your high *metaphyſical Acropolis* as much as you will, and deem thoſe arguments fetched from the frame of nature mean and popular; but for my part, I look upon them as the moſt ſound and ſolid philoſophical arguments that are for the proving the exiſtence of a God. And I wonder you do not obſerve that mighty force

force that Philotheus his comparing of the volume of nature and Archimedes his book of the ſphere and cylinder together has for the evincing ſome intellectual principle to be the framer of the world. For thoſe figures and characters annexed to each propoſition with an effectual ſubſerviency to the demonſtration of them is not a more manifeſt indication of an intellectual agent, than an hundred thouſand ſingle fabricks of matter here in the world are of the like agency; the parts being ſo diſpoſed to one end, as the management of the demonſtration to one concluſion, and the ſubordination of ſeveral concluſions to one final and ultimate one: which ſubordinations of things are alſo moſt evidently and repeatedly conſpicuous in nature.

*Philop.* On my word, Philotheus, you have not ſpent your labour in vain on Hylobares, that does thus judiciouſly and reſentingly recapitulate your main reaſonings from nature for the exiſtence of a God. I hope now, Hylobares, Philotheus may proceed to treat of *God's Kingdom*, we being all ſo well aſſured of his *exiſtence*.

XIV. The obſcurity of the nature of God, and the intricacy of Providence, with preparatory cautions for the better ſatisfaction in theſe points.

*Hyl.* I muſt confeſs, while I am in this company,

company, I am like Saul among the prophets. Philotheus his zeal and ſmartneſs of arguing carries me away captive, whether I will or no, into an aſſent to the concluſion. And indeed when at firſt I ſet my eyes on this ſide of things, there ſhines from them ſuch an intellectual fulgor, that methinks the very glory of the Deity becomes viſible through them. But when I would more fully comprehend his nature, and approach more nigh him, the ſame glory that recreated mine eyes before, ſtrikes me blind, and I loſe the ſight of him by adventuring to look too near him. This is one entanglement and confuſion of mind, that I underſtand not *the Nature of God.* And the ſecond thing is this, *The obſcurity and intricacy of the ways of Providence.*

*Sophr.* Is it not conſonant to the tranſcendency of ſo high a Nature as that of God, Hylobares, that it be acknowledged *incomprehenſible*, as alſo to his infinite wiſdom, that his *ways be paſt finding out?*

*Bath.* This is excellently well ſpoken, O Sophron, if it be rightly underſtood: otherwiſe, to give no other account of the Nature of God and his ways than that they are *unintelligible*, is to encourage the Atheiſt, and yield him the day; for that is the

the thing he does chiefly applaud himself in, that he is secure there is neither head nor foot in the mysteries of religion, and that the very notion of a God implies a contradiction to our faculties.

*Hyl.* I desire only so to understand God, that nothing be attributed to him *repugnant* to *my understanding*, nor any thing found in the world *repugnant* to *his Attributes*.

*Bath.* I believe Philotheus will make this good, that nothing is truly attributed to God but what is most certainly existent in the world, whether we understand it or not; and that there is nothing in the world truly in such circumstances as are repugnant to the Attributes of God.

*Philoth.* I conceive Bathynous means this, that unless we will entangle ourselves with making good some fictitious Attributes of God, or defend his Providence upon false suppositions and circumstances, there will be no greater entanglements touching the notion of God and his Providence, than there would be in the nature of those things we are sure do exist, tho' there were no God in the world. Wherefore Hylobares, let me advise you to this, since you have such fast and certain hold of the existence of the Deity by the repeated effects thereof in nature, not to let that hold go upon any

any grounds that are uncertain or falſe. For the ſcripture declares nothing contradictious touching the Nature of God: nor is there any human authority that has any right to be believed when it propounds contradictions: nor are we bound to burden the notion of a Deity with any thing we are not aſſured implies perfection. Theſe cautions if we uſe, no man, I think, need be much entangled in his thoughts touching the Nature of the Deity.

XV. The attribute of Eternity.

*Hyl.* This is a hopeful preamble, Philotheus, and therefore I will the more chearfully propound my difficulties, which are drawn from theſe five heads; from the *Eternity* of God, from his *Immutability*, from his *Omniſciency*, his *Spirituality*, and his *Omnipreſency*. For, to my underſtanding, the very notion of *Eternity* implies a contradiction, as ſome deſcribe it, namely, That it is an eſſential preſence of all things with God, as well of things paſt, preſent, as to come; and that the duration of God is all of it, as it were, *in one ſteddy and permanent* τὸ νῦν or *inſtant at once*. If there cannot be a God, but he muſt be in ſuch a ſenſe as this eternal, the contemplation of his *idea* will more forcibly pull a man back from the belief of his exiſtence, than

than his effects in nature draw a man to it. For what can be more contradictious, than that all things ſhould have been really and eſſentially with God from all eternity at once, and yet be born in time and ſucceſſion? For the reality and eſſence of corporeal things is corporeal; and thoſe very individual trees and animals that are ſaid to be generated, and are ſeen to grow from very little principles, were always, it ſeems, in their full form and growth: which is a perfect repugnancy to my underſtanding. For it implies that the ſame thing that is already in being may, notwithſtanding, while it is, be produced of a-freſh. That eternal duration ſhould be at once, is alſo to me utterly unconceivable, and that one *permanent inſtant* ſhould be commenſurate, or rather equal to all ſucceſſions of ages. Beſides, if the duration of God be all at once, ſith no agent acts but within the compaſs of its own duration, God muſt both create and deſtroy the world at once. Whence it ſeems impoſſible that eternal duration ſhould be indiſtant to itſelf, or without continuation of intervals.

*Philoth.* You argue ſhrewdly, Hylobares, againſt that notion of eternity that ſome have raſhly pitched upon, but without the leaſt prejudice to the belief of God's

God's exiſtence, if you have but recourſe to thoſe cautions I intimated at firſt, *That we are not bound to believe contradictions upon any man's account.* Theſe are over-ſublime reaches of ſome high-ſoaring wits, that think they never fly high enough till they fly out of the ſight of common ſenſe and reaſon. If we may charitably gueſs at what they would be at in this ſo lofty a notion, it may be it is only this, That the whole evolution of times and ages from everlaſting to everlaſting is ſo collectedly and preſentifickly repreſented to God at once, as if all things and actions which ever were, are, or ſhall be, were at this very inſtant, and ſo always, really preſent and exiſtent before him: which is no wonder, the animadverſion and intellectual comprehenſion of God being abſolutely infinite according to the truth of his *idea*.

*Hyl.* This, I muſt confeſs, is a far more eaſy and paſſable notion than the other.

*Philoth.* Yes ſurely; and not harder to conceive how continuity of duration is alſo competible to the divine exiſtence, as well as *eternity* or *life eternal*, which comprehends the *idea's* of all things and ages at once in the Intellect of God. For it is as a vaſt globe wholly moved on a plain, and carried on in one exile line at once: or like the

the permanency of a ſteady rock by which a river ſlides; the ſtanding of the rock, as well as the ſliding of the river, has a continuity of duration. And no other way can eternity be commenſurate to time than ſo; that is to ſay, the comprehenſion of the evolution of all times, things and tranſactions is permanently exhibited to God in every moment of the ſucceſſion of ages.

*Hyl.* What makes the ſchools then ſo earneſt in obtruding upon us the belief, that nothing but *nunc permanens* is competible to the divine exiſtence?

*Philoth.* It may be out of this conceit, as if that whoſe exiſtence was ſucceſſive would neceſſarily break off, or at leaſt may hazard to fail, one part of ſucceſſive duration having no dependance on another. But it is a mere panick fear: for the continuation of duration is neceſſary where the exiſtence of the thing is ſo. And ſuch is manifeſtly the exiſtence of God from his own *idea*.

*Bath.* And this *neceſſary exiſtence* of God I conceive to be the moſt ſubſtantial notion of his eternal duration: which cannot well be ſaid to be *ſucceſſive* properly and formally, but only virtually and applicatively; that is to ſay, it contains in it *virtually* all the ſucceſſive duration imagi-

nable, and is perpetually *applicable* to the ſucceeding parts thereof, as being always preſent thereto, as the channel of a river to all the water that paſſes through it; but the channel is in no ſuch ſucceſſive defluxion, tho' the water be. Such is the ſteady and permanent duration of the neceſſary exiſtence of God in reſpect of all ſucceſſive durations whatſoever.

*Philoth.* I do not yet ſo throughly underſtand you, Bathynous.

*Bath.* I ſay that *ſucceſſive duration* properly ſo called is incompetible to God, as being an eſſence *neceſſarily* exiſtent, and therefore *without beginning*: but the moſt infinite *ſucceſſive* duration that you can imagine will be found to have a beginning. For whatever is paſt was ſometime preſent: and therefore there being nothing of all this infinite ſucceſſion but was ſometime preſent, the moſt-infinitely-remote moment thereof was ſometime preſent: which moſt-infinitly-remote moment was the *terminus terminans* thereof, which plainly ſhews it had a beginning.

*Philoth.* You ſay true, Bathynous. There muſt be a *moſt-remote-moment* in ſucceſſion, and a moſt-infinitely remote one in infinite ſucceſſion. But being the moſt-infinitely-remote moment cannot be *terminus copulans*,

*copulans*, there being nothing for it to couple with future ſucceſſion, and therefore it being *terminus terminans*, and of neceſſity having been once *preſent*, it is plain that at that preſent was the term or beginning of this infinite ſuppoſed ſucceſſion.

Or briefly thus, to prevent all poſſible exceptions againſt the *moſt*-infinitely-remote moment in an *infinite* ſucceſſion, as if they were ἀσύφαλα, I would rather argue on this manner; *viz.* that foraſmuch as all the moments *paſt* in infinite ſucceſſion were ſometime *preſent*, it thence plainly follows that all the moments in this infinite ſucceſſion, or at leaſt all but one, were ſometime to come. And if either all theſe moments, or all but one, were ſometime to come, it is manifeſt that the whole ſucceſſion (or at leaſt the whole bating but one moment) was ſometime to come, and therefore had a beginning. I underſtand the ſtrength of your reaſoning very well. And therefore when I ſpake of the ſucceſſive duration of God, I did not mean ſucceſſion in that *proper* and *formal* ſenſe, but only a virtual, applicative or relative ſucceſſion; as you might gather from ſome paſſages or expreſſions in my ſpeaking thereof. The duration of *God* is like that of a *rock*, but the duration

of *natural things* like that of a *river*; their ſucceſſion paſſes ποταμῷ δίκην, as Heraclitus ſpeaks. And therefore they that give *ſucceſſive* duration properly ſo called to the ſteady permanency of a neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence, ſeem like thoſe that fanſie the ſhore to move by reaſon of the motion of the ſhip.

*Provehimur portu, terræque urbeſque recedunt.*

We apply our own fluid ſucceſſive duration to the ſteady permanency of the eternal duration of God: whoſe duration tho' ſteady and permanent, and without all defluxion and ſucceſſion, (as being indeed nothing elſe but his *neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence*) is notwithſtanding ſuch as the moſt infinite *ſucceſſive* duration *paſt* can never reach beyond, nor *future* ever exhauſt. Whence it is plain, that tho' the eternal duration of God be really *permanent*, yet it is impoſſible to be an *indiviſible inſtant*, and to be perfectly and in all regards indiſtant to itſelf, and not to comprehend all poſſible ſucceſſive evolutions that are.

XVI. An objection againſt the all-comprehenſion of eternity, with the anſwer thereto.

*Hyl.* This is very well, Philotheus: but yet there are ſome ſcruples ſtill behind. I muſt acknowledge that eternity in your ſenſe bears along with it no palpable contradiction; but methinks it is not altoge-

ther

ther free from a marvellous ſtrange incredibility.

*Philoth.* What's that?

*Hyl.* That all the noiſes and cryings, and howlings and ſhreekings, and knockings and hammerings, and curſings and ſwearings, and prayings and praiſings, that all the voices of men, the ſquawlings of children, the notes of birds, and roarings and ſqueekings of beaſts, that ever were or ſhall be, have ever been in the ears of God at once: and ſo all the turnings and toyings of every viſible object, all the diſperſions, motions and poſtures of hairs, and leaves, and ſtraws, and feathers, and duſt, in fine, all the little and inconſiderable changes of the ever-agitated matter which have been, are, or ever ſhall be, are, and ever were, and ever ſhall be in the ſight of God at once. This ſeems to me, (tho' not an impoſſible, yet) a very incredible *privilege* of all-comprehending eternity.

*Philoth.* This is a wild, unexpected fetch of yours, Hylobares, and as madly expreſſed. But if you will anſwer me ſoberly to a queſtion or two, you ſhall ſee the difficulty will vaniſh of itſelf.

*Hyl.* I will.

*Philoth.* Whether do you think, O Hylobares, that this privilege, as you call it,

is really a privilege, that is, a perfection, of the Divine Nature, or no?

*Hyl.* I cannot tell.

*Euiſt.* Thoſe philoſophers in Maimonides, which I do not well remember whether he calls the ſect of the *loquentes*, would tell us roundly that it is not; they preſuming God's Providence reaches no farther than the *ſpecies* of things, but that he little concerns himſelf in *individuals*.

*Bath.* I ſuppoſe then that they hold that he has concredited the adminiſtration of his more particular Providence to ſeveral orders of Angels, and in ſome ſort to men and all intelligent creatures, in whom he has implanted a law for the rightly ordering individuals.

*Euiſt.* It may be ſo.

*Bath.* Which if they could order as well as if God himſelf look'd on, as it is no addition to God's happineſs to have made the world or to meddle with it; ſo it would be no detriment to the world if he were conceived to be wholly rapt into the contemplation of his own divine excellencies.

*Euiſt.* This, I muſt confeſs, is not much abhorrent from the *Ariſtotelian* theology.

*Bath.* But it is intolerably falſe, if the frame of the creation be not ſuch as that the *ſtanding* ſpirits hugely exceed the number of the *lapſed*.

*Euiſt.*

*Euiſt.* They need do ſo. Beſides, what a ridiculous thing were it to offer ſacrifice or pray to God, if he were always ſo rapt into himſelf that he never were at leiſure to hear us?

*Bath.* That is moſt pertinently obſerv'd, Euiſtor: and all pious men muſt acknowledge that they draw power and influence by their carneſt devotions to the Deity.

*Hyl.* And therefore I eaſily acknowledge that all things in preſent ſucceſſion lie open to the eyes of God. But whether all voices and ſights whatſoever from everlaſting to everlaſting be repreſented continually to him at once, for all that this ſhort ſally of Bathynous and Euiſtor has given me ſome time to think of it, yet I muſt ſtill profeſs I cannot tell.

*Philoth.* Well then, Hylobares, in ſuch a caſe as this, you know the above mentioned rule, *That you are not to let go your hold of thoſe ſolid and certain grounds of the exiſtence of a God, for what is either falſe or uncertain.*

*Hyl.* You ſay very true. Nor does this at all ſhake my belief.

*Philoth.* But farther to corroborate it, anſwer me but this one queſtion, Hylobares. Is it not neceſſary that that part of the repreſen-

preſentation you made of eternity be either a *perfection*, or an *imperfection*, or a thing of *indifferency*?

*Hyl.* That cannot be deny'd.

*Philoth.* If it be an *imperfection*, it is to be removed, and ſo the difficulty is removed therewith: if an *indifferency*, it is indifferent whether you remove it or not: if a *perfection*, being that it is not impoſſible, as you cannot but acknowledge, no man need heſitate, nay he ought not, but to attribute it to God. So that be your fate what it will in the determination of your aſſent to any of theſe three parts, it can be no impediment to the belief of God's exiſtence. This is the thing that made your objection ſeem ſo conſiderable to you, that you did not conſider, that tho' all thoſe voices and ſights are perceived in the Divine Being at once, yet they are perceived in the ſame diſtances and diſtinctneſſes that they are found in, in the very ſucceſſion of ages. For *infinite comprehenſion admits, or rather implies this.*

XXII. Another objection, with its anſwer.

*Hyl.* You are a man, O Philotheus, of the moſt dexterous art in facilitating our adherence to the belief of a Deity that ever I met with in my life. I have but one ſcruple more touching God's eternity, and I will

I will pass to the next Attribute. The eternal succession of God's existence seems to imply a contradiction. For unless every denominated part be infinite, the whole cannot be infinite. And if every denominated part, suppose the tenth, the hundredth, the thousandth, be infinite, there are so many infinites.

*Philoth.* I understand you very well. But you must consider that either God has been *ab æterno*, or the world has been so. Wherefore something being so certainly eternal, it is no repugnancy that God be so. So that you see there is no more perplexity or difficulty on the account of God's Being, than if he were not in the world, according to the last of my preliminary advertisements. Nay, indeed, the most inextricable perplexity of all would be to admit a world *ab æterno* without God. For an eternal flux of motion of the matter would be eternal *succession* properly so called; which Bathynous shrewdly suggested to be impossible. And if it ever rested, and afterwards was moved, there must be a first mover distinct from the matter. Which seems necessarily to infer there is a God; and the rather, because if matter was of itself, it must eternally have rested before it moved.

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* This difficulty has vaniſhed ſo of a ſudden, that I am half aſhamed I ever propounded it.

*Philoth.* I have met with not a few that this would have ſeemed no ſmall difficulty to; ſo that it was not unworthy the propounding.

*Philop.* But I pray you to proceed to the next Attribute, Hylobares: for I am hugely pleaſed to ſee the ſucceſsfulneſs of Philotheus.

XVIII. The Attribute of Immutability.

*Hyl.* The next is *Immutability*, which ſeems to me a neceſſary Attribute of God, foraſmuch as *mutability* implies imperfection. But here human underſtanding does ſeem to be caught in this *dilemma*; That either we muſt acknowledge a mutable God, or an immutable one: if the former, he is not properly God; becauſe God excludes all imperfection in his nature: if the latter, he is not to be worſhipped; for all the good that was to come will come without our worſhipping him; and none of the evil can be kept off by all our ſervices, becauſe he is *immutable*. Wherefore we muſt either grant an imperfect God, or a God not to be worſhipped: either of which is ſo abſurd, that it ſeems forcibly to ſuggeſt that there is no God at all.

*Philoth.*

*Philoth.* This ſeems a ſmart *dilemma* at firſt, Hylobares; yet I think neither horn is ſtrong enough to puſh us off from our belief of the exiſtence of a God. But for my part, I will bear the puſh of the former of them, and grant that God is *mutable*; but deny that all *mutability* implies imperfection, tho' ſome does, as that vacillancy in human ſouls, and ſuch mutations as are found in corporeal matter. But ſuch a mutability as whoſe abſence implies an impotency to or incapacity of the moſt noble acts imaginable, ſuch as the creation of the world, and the adminiſtration of juſtice to men and angels, is ſo far from being any defect, that it is a very high perfection. For this power in God to act upon the creature in *time*, to ſuccour or chaſtiſe it, does not at all diſcompoſe or diſtract him from what he is in himſelf in the bleſſed calmneſs and ſtillneſs of his all-comprehenſive *eternity*, his animadverſion being abſolutely free and infinite. So that they that would account this power of acting in time an imminution to the perfection of God, are, I think, as much out in their account, as if one ſhould contend that $Ac + Aq.$ is leſs than $Ac$ alone.

*Hyl.* This is convincing.

*Bath.* And that you may be the more through-

throughly convinced of the weakneſs of your *diation*, I will bear the puſh of the latter horn, and deny that the *immutability* of God would imply that he is not to be worſhipped. For what is the worſhipping of God but the acknowledging thoſe ſupereminent and divine excellencies in him to which the world owes its conſervation and ſubſiſtence, and from which is that beautiful order and wiſe contrivance of things in the univerſe? It is therefore a piece of indiſpenſible juſtice to acknowledge this rich fountain and original of all good, and not the leſs, becauſe he is ſo perfectly good, that he cannot be nor act otherwiſe, but is immutably ſuch. Beſides, that this praiſe and adoration done to him are actions perfective of our own ſouls, and in our approaches to him he is made nearer to us; as the opening of our eyes is the letting in of the light of the ſun.

*Hyl.* What you ſay, Bathynous, I muſt confeſs will hold good in that part of worſhip which conſiſts in praiſing of God: but I do not ſee how his *Immutability* will well conſiſt with our praying to him. For things will be or will not be whether we pray unto him or no.

*Bath.* But you do not conſider, that tho' this were, yet our praying to him is an acknow-

knowledgment of his being the great Benefactor of mankind; and it is like children aſking their father's bleſſing, who yet would *pray to God to bleſs them* whether they aſk it or no. Beſides that while we pray to God for internal good things, for grace, wiſdom and virtue, we do *ipſo facto* open our ſouls to receive the divine influence, which flows into our hearts according to the meaſure of the depth and earneſtneſs of our devotion. Which is, as I ſaid, like the opening of our eyes to receive the light of the ſun. Nor do we alter or change the will of God in this, becauſe it is the permanent and immutable will of God, that as many as make their due addreſſes to him ſhall receive proportionable comfort and influence from him. And, laſtly, for external good things, tho' we ſhould imagine God ſtill reſting in the immutable *ſabbatiſm* of his own ever-bleſſed *eternity*, and that nothing is done in this world *ad extra* but by either natural or free created agents, either good men or thoſe more high and holy orders of angels, that are as the ears and eyes and arms of God, as *Philo* ſomewhere inſinuates, and who are ſo ſteadily and fully actuated by the Spirit of God, that they will do the very ſame things that God himſelf would do if he

were to act *ad extra* in the affairs of the world: upon this hypotheſis of things, notwithſtanding the immutability of God, it implies no incongruity to pray unto him. For he does not only hear and behold all things at once, but has eternally and immutably laid ſuch trains of cauſes in the world, and ſo rules the good powers and over-rules the bad, that no man that prays unto him as he ought ſhall fail of obtaining what is beſt for him, even in external matters.

*Hyl.* This is a conſideration I never thought of before. But it ſeems to me not altogether irrational.

XIX. Of the Deity's acting *ad extra*.

*Euiſt.* But, methinks, ſomething needleſs, becauſe the divine records do teſtify, that the very Deity ſometimes ſteps out into external action; as in our Saviour *Chriſt*'s feeding the multitude with five loaves and two fiſhes, in his raiſing the dead, and in that great execution he is to do on the globe of the earth at the laſt day.

*Bath.* The Deity indeed does act here *ad extra*, but not the bare Deity, as I may ſo ſpeak, but the Divine Magick of the exalted Soul of the *Meſſias*.

*Euiſt.* But what will you ſay to thoſe paſſages in the Old Teſtament, Bathynous, ſuch

ſuch as the dividing of the Red-ſea, the making of the ſun and moon ſtand ſtill, the keeping of Shadrach, Meſhach and Abednego harmleſs in the fiery furnace, and the like? did not the bare Deity, as you called it, ſtep out then into external action?

*Bath.* You know, Euiſtor, there was a mighty eaſt-wind that blew all night, and divided the ſea; and that there appeared a *fourth* man in the fiery furnace *like unto the Son of* God. And in brief, all the miracles that were done by Moſes or any way elſe among or upon the people of the Jews were done by virtue of the preſence of the ſame *Chriſt*, who was the conductor of the Iſraelites into the land of Canaan, and the *Reſidentiary Guardian* of that people.

*Euiſt.* Indeed I remember ſome ſuch opinion of ſome of the ancient fathers, but I look'd upon it as one of their extravagancies.

*Sophr.* And I upon the hypotheſis of Bathynous as a very high reach of wit; but methought Philotheus had fully ſatisfied Hylobares his *dilemma* before.

XX. The Attribute of Omniſciency.

*Hyl.* I muſt ingenuouſly confeſs, that I think neither of the ſolutions ſo weak but that they ſufficiently enervate my argu-

ment touching the *Immutability* of God: and therefore I willingly paſs on to his *Omniſciency.*

*Philoth.* What is it that pinches you there, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* A *certain* and *determinate* preſcience of things *contingent*, *free* and *uncertain.* For it ſeems otherwiſe to take away the liberty of will and the nature of ſin: for ſin ſeems not to be ſin, unleſs it be voluntary.

*Philoth.* It may be not, Hylobares. But why do you then attribute ſuch a Preſcience to God as is involved in ſuch dangerous inconveniencies?

*Hyl.* Becauſe it is a greater Perfection in God to foreſee all things that are to come to paſs certainly and determinately, than the contrary.

*Philoth.* And would it not be a greater Perfection in the *Omnipotency* of God to be able to do all things, even thoſe that imply a contradiction, than not be able to do them?

*Hyl.* It would. But becauſe they imply a contradiction to be done, no body thinks the Omnipotency of God maimed or blemiſhed in that it reaches not to ſuch things.

*Philoth.* Why then, Hylobares, if *certain* preſcience of *uncertain* things or events

vents imply a *contradiction*, it ſeems it may be ſtruck out of the Omniſciency of God, and leave no ſcar nor blemiſh behind; for God will nevertheleſs be as *omniſcient* as he is *omnipotent*. But if it imply no contradiction, what hinders but we may attribute it to him?

*Hyl.* But it ſeems neceſſary to attribute it to him: elſe how can he manage the affairs of the world?

*Philoth.* O Hylobares, take you no care for that. For that eternal Mind that knows all things poſſible to be known, comprehends all things that are poſſible to be done, and ſo hath laid ſuch trains of cauſes as ſhall moſt certainly meet every one in due time in judgment and righteouſneſs, let him take what way he will.

*Hyl.* I underſtand you, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* And you may further underſtand that, according to ſome, what you would attribute to God as a Perfection ſounds more like an imperfection, if well conſidered.

*Hyl.* Why ſo, Philotheus?

*Philoth.* Is it not the perfection of knowledge to know things as they are in their own nature?

*Hyl.* It is ſo.

*Philoth.* Wherefore to know a *free a-*

*gent*, which is *undeterminate* to either part, to be ſo *undeterminate*, and that he may chuſe which part he will, is the moſt perfect knowledge of ſuch an agent and of his action, till he be perfectly determinate and has made his choice.

*Hyl.* It ſeems ſo.

*Philoth.* Therefore to know him determined before he be determined, or while he is free, is an imperfection of knowledge, or rather no knowledge at all, but a miſtake and error; and indeed is a contradiction to the Nature of God, who can underſtand nothing but according to the diſtinct *idea's* of things in his own mind. And the *idea* of a *free agent* is *undeterminateneſs* to one part before he has made choice. Whence to foreſee that a free agent will pitch upon ſuch a part in his choice, with knowledge certain and infallible, is to foreſee a thing as certain even then when it is uncertain; which is a plain contradiction or groſs miſtake.

*Hyl.* You do more than ſatisfy me in this, Philotheus, That to conceive things undeterminate determinately, or that they will be certainly this way while they may be either this way or that way, is an imperfection or contradiction to the truth. But there is yet this piece of perplexity behind,

behind, that this pretence of perfection of knowledge will neceſſarily infer an imperfection or inability of predicting future actions and free agents, and take away *divine inſpiration* and *prophecy*.

*Philoth.* That is ſhrewdly urged and ſeaſonably. But you are to underſtand, that ſo much liberty as is in man will leave room enough for millions of certain predictions, if God thought fit to communicate them ſo throngly to the world. For tho' I queſtion not but that the ſouls of men are in ſome ſenſe free; yet I do as little doubt but there are or may be infinite numbers of actions wherein they are as certainly determined as the brute beaſts. And ſuch are the actions of all thoſe that are deeply lapſed into corruption, and of thoſe few that are grown to a more heroical ſtate of goodneſs: it is certainly foreknowable what they will do in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances. Not to add, that the divine decrees, when they find not men fitting tools, make them ſo, where prophecies are peremptory or unconditionate.

*Bath.* What Philotheus has hitherto argued for the reconciling of the divine Omniſcience with the notion of man's free-will and the nature of ſin, bears along with it a commendable plainneſs and plauſibleneſs

neſs for it's eaſineſs to the underſtanding. But in my apprehenſion, for all it looks ſo repugnantly that there ſhould be a certain foreknowledge of what is free and uncertain, yet it ſeems more ſafe to allow that privilege to the infinite underſtanding of God, than to venture at all to circumſcribe his Omniſcience. For tho' it may ſafely be ſaid, that he does not know any thing that *really* implies a contradiction to be known; yet we are not aſſured but that may ſeem a contradiction to us that is not ſo really in itſelf. As for example, To our finite underſtanding a quadrate whoſe diagonial is commenſurate to one of the ſides is a plain contradiction, and we conceit we can demonſtrate it to be ſo, that is to ſay, that the *ratio* of the one to the other is unconceivable and undefinable. But dare any one be ſo bold as to affirm that the Divine Intellect itſelf, whoſe comprehenſion is infinite, cannot define to itſelf the *ratio* of a diagonial line in a quadrate to the ſide thereof? The application is very obvious.

*Philoth.* It is ſo, Bathynous. For I ſuppoſe in brief you mean this; That as the diagonial line and ſide of a quadrate, which to our apprehenſion are incommenſurate, are yet commenſurable to the infinite comprehenſion of the Divine Intellect; ſo a certain

certain and infallible Preſcience of uncertain futurities, that ſeems inconſiſtent to us, may notwithſtanding be deprehended abundantly conſiſtent by the all-comprehenſive underſtanding of God. A very ſafe and ſober ſolution of the preſent difficulty. I am very well contented it ſhould be ſo, Bathynous, and that what I have offered at therein ſhould paſs as ſpoken by way of Eſſay rather than of dogmatizing, and according to the ſenſe of others rather than mine own.

*Philop.* I never ſaw that ſaying ſo much verified any-where, that *wiſdom is eaſy to him that underſtands*, as in Bathynous and Philotheus' diſcourſes. Are you not throughly ſatisfied hitherto, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* I muſt confeſs I am. But now I come to the moſt confounding point, and which is ſuch as that I fear it is fatal to me never to be ſatisfied in.

*Philoth.* What is that, Hylobares?

XXI. The Attribute of Spirituality, and that God cannot be material.

*Hyl.* The *Spirituality* of God. It is the proper diſeaſe of my mind, not to be able to conceive any thing that is not *material* or *corporeal*. But I hope it is not a diſeaſe unto death.

*Philoth.* God forbid it ſhould be, Hylobares,

bares, ſo long as it is no impediment to the belief of the Exiſtence of God, and of all thoſe Attributes that are requiſite for the engaging a man's ſoul in the purſuit of true piety and virtue. God will at laſt bring ſuch an one to the true knowledge of himſelf, whatever his ignorance may be for the preſent. And for my part, I am not fond of the notion of *ſpirituality*, nor any notion elſe, but ſo far forth as they are ſubſervient to *life* and *godlineſs*; that there may be as much happineſs in this life, as human affairs are capable of, and that we may be eternally happy in the life to come. Otherwiſe I have no ſuch great ſollicitude, that any ſhould be ſuch trim and preciſe ſpeculators of things, as not to err an hairs-breadth in matters of great perplexity and obſcurity.

*Euiſt.* I read that ſome of the Fathers have been of opinion that God is a kind of *pure ſubtile body.*

*Bath.* That may very well be. But then they had not that true and preciſe notion of a ſubtile body that moſt philoſophers have in this age: but it is likely they underſtood no more thereby, than that it was a *ſubtile extended ſubſtance*; which, for my part, I conceive in the general may be true. But to ſay it is properly a ſubtile body,

body, is to acknowledge it a *congeries* of very little atomes toying and playing one by another, which is too mean a conception of the Majesty of God. Besides, that it is unconceivable how these loose atomes, which are so independent of one another, should join together to make up the Godhead; or how they do conspire to keep together, that there is not a dissolution of the Divinity. Or thus: if this multitude of divine atomes be God, be they interspersed amongst all the matter of the world? or do they keep together? If they be dispersed, God is less one than any thing else in the world, and is rather an infinite number of Deities than one God or any God; and this infinite number in an incapacity of conferring notes to contrive so wise a frame of the universe as we see. But if there be one *congeries* of divine atomes that keep together, in which of those infinite numbers of *vortices* is it seated? or amongst which? or how it can it order the matter of those *vortices* from which it is so far distant? or how again do these atomes, tho' not interspersed, communicate notions one with another for one design? Do they talk or discourse with one another? or what do they do? And then again——

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* Nay forbear, Bathynous, to go any farther, for you have put me quite out of conceit with a *material* Deity already, the more my grief and pain. For to make a *material* Deity, I muſt confeſs, ſeems extremely ridiculous; and to make a *ſpiritual* one impoſſible: ſo that I am in greater ſtraits than ever I was.

XXII. The falſe notion of a ſpirit.

*Philoth.* Why, Hylobares, what conceit have you of a *Spirit*, that you ſhould think it a thing impoſſible?

*Hyl.* Is it not infinitely incredible, Philotheus, if not impoſſible, that ſome thouſands of ſpirits may dance or march on a needle's point at once?

*Euph.* Ay, and that booted and ſpurr'd too.

*Hyl.* And that in one inſtant of time they can fly from one pole of the world to the other?

*Philoth.* Theſe things, I muſt confeſs, ſeem very incredible.

*Hyl.* And that the ſpirit of man, which we uſually call his ſoul, is wholly, without ſhitting, in his toe, and wholly in his head, at once? If the whole ſoul be in the toe, there is nothing left to be in the head. Therefore the notion of a ſpirit is perfectly impoſſible: or elſe all things are alike

alike true: for nothing ſeems more impoſſible than this.

*Philoth.* But whoſe deſcription of a *Spirit* is this, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* It is, Philotheus, the deſcription of the venerable ſchools.

*Philoth.* But did I not pre-advertiſe you, that no human authority has any right of being believed when they propound contradictions? Wherefore their raſh deſcription of a ſpirit ought to be no prejudice to the truth of its exiſtence. And tho' the true notion of a ſpirit were incomprehenſible, yet that would be no ſolid argument againſt the reality of it; as you may obſerve in the nature of *eternal ſucceſſion*, which we cannot deny to be, tho' we be not able to comprehend it.

XXIII. That there is a ſpiritual Being in the world.

*Hyl.* That is very true indeed, and very well worth the noting. But how ſhall we be ſo well aſſured of the *exiſtence* of a ſpirit, while the comprehenſion of its *nature* is taken for deſperate?

*Philoth.* That there is ſome intellectual Principle in the world, you were abundantly convinced from the works of nature, as much as that *Archimedes* his treatiſe *de ſphæra & cylindro* was from a rational agent: and even now it ſeemed ridiculous to you

beyond all measure, that a *congeries* of atomes should be *divine* and *intellectual*: wherefore there is something that is not *matter* that is *intellectual*, which must be a substance immaterial or incorporeal, that is in a word, a *Spirit*.

*Hyl.* I am, I must confess, very strongly urged to believe there is a *Spirit* as well as an *eternal Duration*, tho' I can comprehend neither.

*Philoth.* And that you may be farther corroborated in your belief, consider the manifold stories of apparitions, and how many spectres have been seen or felt to wrestle, pull or tug with a man: which, if they were a mere *congeries* of atomes, were impossible. How could an arm of mere air or æther pull at another man's hand or arm, but it would easily part in the pulling? Admit it might use the motion of *pulsion*, yet it could never that of *attraction*.

*Hyl.* This indeed were a palpable demonstration that there must be some other substance in these spectres of air or æther, if the histories were true.

*Euist.* We read such things happening even in all ages and places of the world; and there are modern and fresh examples every day: so that no man need doubt of the truth.

*Hyl.*

XXIV. That extenſion and matter are not reciprocal.

*Hyl.* Theſe experiments indeed ſtrike very ſtrongly on the imagination and ſenſes, but there is a ſubtile reaſon that preſently unlooſes all again. And now methinks I could wiſh the *nature* of a ſpirit were more unknown to me than it is, that I might believe its *exiſtence* without meddling at all with its *eſſence*. But I cannot but know thus much of it, whether I will or no, that it is either extended, or not extended; I mean, it has either ſome *amplitude* of *eſſence*, or elſe none at all. If it has no *amplitude* or extenſion, the ridiculous hypotheſis of the ſchools will get up again, and millions of ſpirits, for ought I know, may dance on a needle's point, or rather, they, having no *amplitude*, would be nothing. If they have any *amplitude* or extenſion, they will not be *ſpirits*, but mere *body* or *matter*. For, as that admired wit, Des-Cartes ſolidly concludes, *extenſion is the very eſſence of matter*. This is one of the greateſt arguments that fatally bear me off from a chearful cloſing with the belief of ſpirits properly ſo called.

*Philoth.* It is much, Hylobares, that you ſhould give ſuch an adamantine aſſent to ſo weak and precarious an aſſertion as this of Des-Cartes. For tho' it be wittily ſup-

poſed by him, for a ground of more certain and mathematical after-deductions in his philoſophy; yet it is not at all proved, that matter and extenſion are reciprocally the ſame, *as well every extended thing matter, as all matter extended.* This is but an upſtart conceit of this preſent age. The ancient atomical philoſophers were as much for a *vacuum* as for *atomes*. And certainly the world has hitherto been very idle, that have made ſo many diſputes and try'd ſo many experiments whether there be any *vacuum* or no, if it be ſo demonſtratively concludible, as Des-Cartes would bear us in hand, that it implies a contradiction there ſhould be any. The ground of the demonſtration lies ſo ſhallow and is ſo obvious, that none could have miſſed of it, if they could have thought there had been any force in it.

*Hyl.* It is true, this might in reaſon abate a man's confidence a little, Philotheus; but the apprehenſion is ſo deeply rivetted into my mind, that ſuch rhetorical flouriſhes cannot at all looſen or bruſh it out.

XXV. That there is an extenſion intrinſical to motion.

*Philoth.* Well then, give me leave, Hylobares, to attack you ſome other way. Did

Did you not ſay even now, that whatever has no extenſion or amplitude is nothing?

*Hyl.* I did, and do not repent me of ſo ſaying. For I doubt not but that it is true.

*Philoth.* Wherefore *extenſion* or *amplitude* is an intrinſical or eſſential property of *ens quatenus ens*, as the metaphyſicians phraſe it.

*Hyl.* It is ſo.

*Philoth.* And what is an intrinſical or eſſential attribute of a thing, is in the thing itſelf.

*Hyl.* Where ſhould it be elſe?

*Philoth.* Wherefore there is extenſion in every *thing* or *entity*.

*Hyl.* It cannot be deny'd.

*Philoth.* And it can as little be deny'd but that motion is an *entity*, I mean a *phyſical entity*.

*Hyl.* It cannot.

*Philoth.* Therefore extenſion is an intrinſecal property of motion.

*Hyl.* It muſt be acknowledged; what then?

*Philoth.* What then? Do you not yet ſee, Hylobares, how weak an aſſertion that of Des-Cartes is, That extenſion and matter are reciprocal? for you plainly ſee that extenſion is intrinſecal to motion, and yet motion is not matter.

*Hyl.* Motion is not *ens*, but *modus entis.*

*Philoth.* Nay, by your favour, Hylobares, motion is *ens*, tho' in some sense it may be said to be *modus corporis.*

*Hyl.* Methinks I am, I know not how, Philotheus, illaqueated, but not truly captivated into an assent to your conclusion.

*Philoth.* That is because you are already held captive in that inured conceit of Des-Cartes, that makes you suspect solid reason for a sophism.

*Hyl.* If motion were a thing that was loose or *exemptitious* from matter, then I could not but be convinced that it had extension of its own; but being it is a mere mode of matter, that cannot pass from it into another subject, it has no other extension than that of the matter itself it is in.

*Philoth.* But if it have another essence from the matter itself, by your own concession it must however have another extension. Besides, you seem mistaken in what I mean by motion. For I mean not simply the *translation*, but the *vis agitans* that pervades the whole body that is moved. Which both Regius and Des-Cartes acknowledge *exemptitious* and loose, so that it may pass from one part of matter to another.

*Hyl.* But what is that to me, if I do not?

*Philoth.*

*Philoth.* It is at leaſt thus much to you, that you may take notice how raſhly and groundleſly both Des-Cartes and Regius aſſert extenſion and matter to be reciprocal, while in the mean time they affirm that which according to your own judgment does plainly and convincingly infer that extenſion is more general than matter.

*Hyl.* It is, I muſt confeſs, a ſign that the apprehenſions of men are very humourſome and lubricous.

*Philoth.* And therefore we muſt take heed, Hylobares, how we let our minds cleave to the opinion of any man out of admiration of his perſon.

*Hyl.* That is good advice, and of great conſequence (if it be given betimes) for the keeping out of error and falſhood. But when a fancy is once ingrafted in the mind, how ſhall one get it out?

*Philoth.* I muſt confeſs I marvel much, Hylobares, that you being ſo fully convinced that every real and phyſical *entity* has an intrinſecal extenſion of its own, and that motion is a phyſical entity different from matter, you ſhould not be preſently convinced that motion has alſo an intrinſecal extenſion of its own. To which you might add, that the manner of the extenſion of matter is different from the nature of the

the extenſion in motion: the former being one ſingle extenſion, not to be leſſened nor increaſed without the leſſening and increaſe of the matter itſelf; but the other a gradual extenſion, to be leſſened or augmented without any leſſening or augmenting the matter. Whence again it is a ſign that it has an extenſion of its own, *reduplicative* into itſelf, or reducible to thinner or weaker degrees; while the extenſion of the matter remains ſtill ſingle and the ſame.

*Hyl.* I muſt confeſs, Philotheus, that I am brought to theſe ſtraits, that I muſt either renounce that principle, That every phyſical entity has an intrinſecal extenſion of its own, as much as it has an intrinſecal eſſence of its own, (which I know not how to do;) or elſe I muſt acknowledge that ſomething beſides matter is extended. But I muſt take time to conſider of it. I am ſomething ſtaggered in my judgment.

XXVI. That there is an immovable extenſion diſtinct from that of movable matter.

*Philoth.* Give me leave then, Hylobares, to follow my blow with one ſtroke and ſee if I cannot ſtrike your opinion with one blow more to the ground.

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* Do, Philotheus, I will ſtand the ſhock of it.

*Philoth.* Place yourſelf then under the æquinoctial line, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* Is it not better being in this cool arbour?

*Philoth.* I hope the mere imagination of the torrid zone will not heat you. But you may place yourſelf in a more temperate clime, if you pleaſe.

*Hyl.* What then Philotheus?

*Philoth.* Shoot up an arrow perpendicularly from the earth; the arrow, you know, will return to your foot again.

*Hyl.* If the wind hinder not. But what does this arrow aim at?

*Philoth.* This arrow has deſcribed only right lines with its point, upwards and downwards, in the air; but yet, holding the motion of the earth, it muſt alſo have deſcribed in ſome ſenſe a circular or curvilinear line.

*Hyl.* It muſt ſo.

*Philoth.* But if you be ſo impatient of the heat abroad, neither your body nor your fancy need ſtep out of this cool bowre. Conſider the round trencher that glaſs ſtands upon; it is a kind of ſhort *cylinder*, which you may eaſily imagine a foot longer if you will.

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* Very eaſily, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* And as eaſily fancy a line drawn from the top of the *axis* of that *cylinder* to the *peripherie* of the *baſis*.

*Hyl.* Every jot as eaſily.

*Philoth.* Now imagine this *cylinder* turned round on its *axis*. Does not that line from the top of the *axis* to the *peripherie* of the *baſis* neceſſarily deſcribe a *conicum* in one circumvolution?

*Hyl.* It does ſo Philotheus.

*Philoth.* But it deſcribes no ſuch figure in the wooden cylinder itſelf: as the arrow in the aereal or material æquinoctial circle deſcribes not any line but a right one. In what therefore does the one deſcribe, ſuppoſe, a *circular line*, the other a *conicum*?

*Hyl.* As I live, Philotheus, I am ſtruck as it were with lightning from this ſurprizing conſideration.

*Philoth.* I hope, Hylobares, you are pierced with ſome meaſure of illumination.

*Hyl.* I am ſo.

*Philoth.* And that you are convinced, that whether *you live* or no, that there ever was, is, and ever will be an *immovable extenſion* diſtinct from that of *movable matter*.

*Hyl.* This evidently demonſtrates the exiſtence of the ancient *democritiſh vacuum*,

*um*, and withal that extenſion and matter are not convertible terms; for which yet Carteſius ſo much contends. This conceit is ſtruck quite dead with the point of the arrow deſcribing a curvilinear line in the ſteady æquinoctial circle. And if it ſhould ever offer to flame out again into life in my thoughts, I would uſe the *conicum* as an extinguiſher to ſmother it.

*Philop.* What a chearful thing the apprehenſion of truth is, that it makes Hylobares ſo pleaſant and ſo witty?

XXVII. That this extenſion diſtinct from matter is not imaginary, but real.

*Ciph.* But methinks he claps his wings before the victory, or rather ſubmits before he be overcome. For it may be ſeaſonably ſuggeſted, that it is *real extenſion* and *matter* that are terms convertible; but that extenſion wherein the arrow-head deſcribes a curvilinear line is only *imaginary*.

*Hyl.* But it is ſo imaginary, that it cannot poſſibly be diſ-imagined by human underſtanding. Which methinks ſhould be no ſmall earneſt that there is more than an imaginary being there. And the ancient Atomiſts* call this *vacuum* τὴν ἀναφῆ φύσιν, the *intangible nature*; which is a ſign they thought it ſome real thing. Which appears farther

* Diog. Laert. in vita Epicuri.

farther from their declaring, that this and atomes were the only true things, but that the reſt were mere appearances. And Ariſtotle ſomewhere in his *phyſicks* expreſly declares of the *Pythagoreans*, that they held there was a *vacuum*, from an infinite ſpirit that pervades heaven or the univerſe, as living and breathing in virtue thereof.

*Euiſt.* I remember the paſſage very well: it is in the fourth book and the ſixth chapter. Εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενὸν, καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτό τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος ὡς ἄν ἀναπνέοντι.

*Bath.* As if this *Pythagorick vacuum* were that to the univerſe which the air is to particular animals, that wherein and whereby they live and breathe. Whence it is manifeſt the *Pythagoreans* held it no imaginary being.

*Hyl.* And laſtly, O Cuphophron, unleſs you will flinch from the dictates of your ſo highly-admired Des-Cartes, foraſmuch as this *vacuum* is extended, and meaſurable, and the like, it muſt be a reality; becauſe *non entis nulla eſt affectio*, according to the reaſonings of your beloved maſter. From whence it ſeems evident that there is an extended ſubſtance far more ſubtil than body, that pervades the whole matter of the univerſe.

*Bath.*

*Bath.* Excellently well argued, O Hylobares! Thou art become not only a disciple, but a very able champion for the truth of immaterial beings, and therefore art not far off from the right apprehenſion of the nature of God. Of whoſe eſſence I muſt confeſs I have always been prone to think this ſubtile extenſion (which a man cannot diſ-imagine but muſt needs be) to be a more obſcure ſhadow or adumbration, or to be a more general and confuſed apprehenſion of the *Divine Amplitude*. For this will be neceſſarily, tho' all matter were annihilated out of the world. Nay indeed this is antecedent to all matter, foraſmuch as no matter nor any being elſe can be conceived to be but in this. In this are all things neceſſarily apprehended *to live and move and have their being.*

Sophr. * *Lord, thou haſt been our dwelling-place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadſt formed the earth or the world: even from everlaſting to everlaſting thou art God.*

*Bath.* Whence the *Cabbaliſts* have not vainly attributed thoſe titles of *Adonâi* and *Makôm* unto God, who is the *immovable Mover*, *Receptacle* and *Suſtainer* of all

 things.

* Pſal. 90. 1, 2.

things. Anſwerable to what Hylobares noted of the opinion of the *Pythagoreans*, who have a great affinity with the ancient *Cabbaliſts*.

*Cuph.* What myſterious conceits has Bathynous of what can be but a mere *vacuum* at beſt?

*Bath.* It is an extenſion plainly diſtinct from that of matter, and more neceſſarily to be imagined in this diſtinctneſs than that extenſion of matter, and therefore a ground infinitely more certain of the exiſtence of an infinite *Spirit* than the other of indefinite *matter*. For while that extenſion which Carteſius would build his matter on is conceived *movable*, this *Spirit* is neceſſarily ſuppoſed in which it *moves*, as appears from Philotheus his inſtances. So that *this* is the *extenſion only* which muſt imply the neceſſity of the exiſtence of ſome real being thereunto appertaining; which therefore muſt be coincident with the *Eſſence of God*, and cannot but be a *Spirit*, becauſe it pervades the matter of the univerſe.

*Cuph.* It is only the capacity of matter, Bathynous.

*Bath.* What do you mean by capacity, Cuphophron? Matter *in potentia*?

*Cuph.* Yes.

*Bath.*

*Bath.* But we conceive this extenſion looſly diſtinct from that of matter: that of matter being *movable*, this *immovable*; that of matter *diſcerpible*, this *indiſcerpible*. For if it were diſcerpible, it would be alſo movable, and ſo *ipſo facto* diſtinguiſh itſelf from the indiſcerpible and immovable extenſion. But when *ens potentia* is once made *ens actu*, they are one and the ſame undivided eſſence actually exiſtent, nor can poſſibly be looſe from one another while they are: as your metaphyſical wit cannot but eaſily apprehend.

*Cuph.* I cannot ſo eaſily apprehend it in this caſe, Bathynous, who muſt, with Des-Cartes make *extenſion* and *matter* reciprocal. For I am certain I am illaqueated with a mere ſophiſm, foraſmuch as I eaſily conceive that, if God were exterminated as well as matter out of the world, yet this extenſion you talk ſo magnificently of would to my deluded fancy ſeem neceſſarily to remain. But if there were no God nor matter, there would be nothing. Which is a plain ſign that this remaining extenſion is the extenſion of nothing, and therefore that itſelf is nothing but our imagination.

*Bath.* This is cunningly fetch'd about, O Cuphophron. But if you well conſider things, this fetch of yours, which ſeems

to be againſt me, is really for me. For in that you acknowledge that while you conceive God exterminated out of the world, this extenſion does notwithſtanding remain, it is but an indication of what is true, that the conception of God's being exterminated out of the world implies a contradiction, as moſt certainly it does. For no eſſence that is exterminable can be the eſſence of God, foraſmuch as his eſſence implies neceſſary exiſtence. Wherefore that God which you did exterminate, that is to ſay, conceived exterminable, was a figment of your own: but that extenſion which remains to you whether you will or no, is really and indentifically coincident with the amplitude of the eſſence of God. Whence we may ſee not only the folly, but the impiety, of the other poſition, which would tranſplant that main prerogative of God, I mean his neceſſary exiſtence, upon matter, upon pretence that whatever is extended muſt be ſuch; and withal neceſſarily exterminate God out of the univerſe with as many as cannot conceive any thing to be but what is extended, that is to ſay, has ſome kind of amplitude or other.

XXVIII. A freſh appeal touching the truth of that point to reaſon, ſenſe and imagination.

*Hyl.* And therefore it had been my inevitable

vitable fate to have been an Atheiſt, had not Philotheus ſo fortunately freed me from ſo miſchievous a conceit by thoſe inſtances of the *conicum* and arrow. For I do moſt immutably apprehend thereby, that there is an extenſion diſtinct from that of matter, which tho' we ſhould admit to be imaginary, yet this at leaſt will reſult therefrom, That extenſion being thus neceſſarily applicable as well to imaginary things as to real, it is rather a *logical* notion than a *phyſical*, and conſequently is applicable to all objects as well *metaphyſical* as *phyſical*.

*Cuph.* As well *phantaſtical* or *imaginary* as *phyſical*, you ſhould ſay, Hylobares. For if any real thing be extended, it is *ipſo facto* matter, as that oracle of philoſophy has concluded, I mean Renatus Des-Cartes.

*Hyl.* That is again ſpitefully interpoſed, Cuphophron, (but not at all proved) and yet repugnantly to your own admired oracle, who has declared, as I told you before, that *nihili nulla eſt affectio*. Wherefore there being a meaſurable extenſion diſtinct from that of matter, there is alſo a ſubſtance diſtinct from matter, which therefore muſt be *immaterial*, and conſequently *metaphyſical*. But that there is an extenſi-

on distinct from matter, is apparent in that instance of the *conicum*.

*Cuph.* There is no real description of a *conicum*, Hylobares, nor in any extension but that of the wooden cylinder itself. These are whims and turnings of our fancy only: and then we make grave theological inferences, and uses of reproof, as if we carried all before us.

*Hyl.* Answer me but with patience, Cuphophron, and I doubt not but I shall quickly convince you, that there is more than fancy in those arguings. I will appeal to your *reason*, your *imagination*, and your *sense*. What therefore is it, O Cuphophron, to describe a figure, as the mathematicians speak, but to draw some *extensum* or some point of it through the parts of some other *extensum*, so that the parts are passed through of that *extensum* in which the figure is said to be described?

*Cuph.* Right, Hylobares, that is plain at first sight.

*Hyl.* This to gratify your *reason*. But farther too, to caress your *sense* and *fancy*, let us imagine for that wooden cylinder a glass one, with a red line in it for its *axis*, and from the top of this *axis* another red line drawn down to the peripherie of the *basis*; which lines would be visible to your

your very ſight through the tranſparent glaſs?

*Cuph.* A fine thing to play with, Hylobares, what then?

*Hyl.* I would have you play with ſuch a thing, O Cuphophron, but in ſuch ſort, as to make it turn ſwiftly upon its *axis*. And there will appear to your very ſight a red *conicum*, like the uſual ſhape of an extinguiſher. If the line were blue, it would be like it ſomething in colour as well as figure. This I conceive (for I never try'd it, nor thought of it before now) you might diſtinctly ſee in the glaſs.

*Cuph.* A goodly ſight: but what of all this?

*Hyl.* I demand in what *extenſum* this *conicum* is deſcribed?

*Cuph.* In the ſame it is ſeen, namely in the glaſs, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* You anſwer what is impoſſible, Cuphopron, and againſt your firſt conceſſion. For the red line does not paſs through the parts of the glaſs, but is carried along with them, and therefore cannot deſcribe the *conicum* in it. But there is a *conicum* deſcribed even to your very *ſenſe*. In what *extenſum* therefore is it deſcribed?

*Cuph.* In an imaginary *extenſum*.

*Hyl.* But what is imaginary, Cuphophron, is

is a figment made at pleaſure by us: But this *extenſum* we cannot diſ-imagine, as I told you before, but it is whether we will or no: for no figure can be drawn but through the parts of ſome *extenſum*.

*Cuph.* I am caſt upon the ſame anſwers again that I was before: then it is the *idea* of a poſſible *extenſum*, which indeed the glaſs-cylinder actually is.

*Hyl.* That is to ſay, It is the particular or individual poſſible *idea* of that *extenſum* which the glaſs-cylinder is actually.

*Cuph.* It is that, or elſe I confeſs I know not what it is. It is a mockery of the mind, it is a troubleſome fallacy.

*Hyl.* But you do not mean any *idea* in our brain by this poſſible *idea*. For the red line that deſcribes the *conicum* is in the glaſs, not in our brain.

*Cuph.* Therefore I muſt mean the object of that *idea*.

*Hyl.* But is not the actual deſcribing of a figure in a mere poſſible *extenſum* like ſenſe to the writing of an actual epiſtle in a poſſible ſheet of paper? Beſides, this particular or individual *poſſible idea* of the *extenſum* which this particular cylinder is, *actually* is an immovable *extenſum*, but this cylinder removable from it even while it does exiſt. How can it then be that particular

cular poſſible *extenſum* which the cylinder is actually: but admit it could be, and let this cylinder be removed from this poſſible immovable *extenſum*, and another cylinder of the ſame bigneſs ſucceed into its place. Now this ſecond cylinder is *actually* that particular *extenſum* which ſtill the ſame individual poſſible *extenſum* is or was *potentially*. And ſo both the firſt and ſecond cylinders are one and the ſame individual cylinder: for one *individual poſſibility* can afford no more than one *individual actuality* in the world. And therefore one and the ſame cylinder is in two diſtant places at once.

*Sophr.* This makes Cuphophron rub his temples. I believe he is confounded in the midſt of this hot and haſty career he has taken a-freſh in the behalf of Des Cartes. Let me help him a little. It may be that immovable poſſible cylindriacal *extenſum* is the *genus* of the two other *cylinders*, and, as I remember, * Des-Cartes intimates ſome ſuch thing.

*Hyl.* But how can that which is *immovable*, O Sophron, be the *genus* of thoſe things that are *movable*? And we will ſuppoſe both theſe cylinders removed from this

* Princ. philoſ. par. 2. ſect. 10, 11.

this poſſible cylindrical *extenſum*, and thus the *genus* will be deſerted of its *ſpecies*, and the *ſpecies* deſtitute of their *genus*. Which can be good in no *logick* but Cuphophron's or Des-Cartes'. But if by *genus* you mean a mere logical notion, that is only in the brain, which the red line is not, but in the glaſs.

*Sophr.* Nay, I perceive there is no dealing with Hylobares when his wit is once awakened. I am preſently forced to ſound a retreat. And yet I care not to caſt this one conceit more at him before I run away. What if I ſhould ſay it is only *ſpatium imaginarium*, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* Then you would only ſay but what in effect Cuphophron has ſaid twice already. But I tell you, Sophron, that the extenſion of this ſpace which you call *imaginary* is real. *For whatſoever is a real affection or attribute any-where*, (and you know extenſion is ſo in matter) *is every where real where it is deprehended to be independently on our imagination.* And that this extenſion is actual, neceſſary and independent on our imagination, is plainly diſcoverable in thoſe inſtances of the *arrow* and *conicum*.

*Philoth.* You are an excellent proficient, Hylobares, that can thus vary, emprove and

and maintain things from ſo few and ſlender hints. I never ſpoke with better ſucceſs to any one in all my life touching theſe matters.

XXIX. The eſſential properties of matter.

*Hyl* I find myſelf hugely at eaſe ſince your freeing me, O Philotheus, from that prejudice, *that whatſoever is extended, muſt be matter*. Whence I can now eaſily admit the exiſtence of ſpirits; but have therefore the greater curioſity, and find myſelf finely at leiſure, to be more punctually inſtructed concerning the nature of them.

*Philoth.* I dare ſay, Hylobares, you will be able abundantly to inſtruct yourſelf touching that point, if we do but firſt carefully ſettle the notion of matter, whoſe eſſence I conceive conſiſts chiefly in theſe three attributes, *ſelf-diſunity*, *ſelf-impenetrability*, and *ſelf-inactivity*.

*Hyl.* But I deſire, O Philotheus, to know the diſtinct meaning of every one of theſe terms.

*Philoth.* By *ſelf-diſunity* I underſtand nothing elſe but that matter has no *vinculum* of its own to hold it together, ſo that of itſelf it would be diſunited into a *congeries* of mere *phyſical monads*, that is, into ſo little particles, that it implies a contradiction they ſhould be leſs.

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* I underſtand the notion well enough. But what makes you attribute *diſunity* to matter rather than firm union of parts, eſpecially you attributing *ſelf-inactivity* thereto?

*Philoth.* Becauſe there is no *vinculum* imaginable in matter to hold the parts together. For you know they are impenetrable, and therefore touch one another as it were in ſmooth *ſuperficies's*. How therefore can they hold together? what is the principle of their union?

*Cuph.* O, that is very clear, Philotheus; that ſtupendious wit Des-Cartes plainly tells us that it is *reſt*.

*Philoth.* But I pray do you tell me, Cuphophron, what is *reſt*?

*Cuph.* That is eaſily underſtood from *motion*, which Des-Cartes intimates to be the ſeparation or tranſlation of one part of matter from the other.

*Philoth.* And ſo *reſt* is the *union* or *unſeparateneſs* of one part of matter from another.

*Cuph.* I can imagine nothing elſe by it. For if a whole maſs of matter move together in one hard piece, the whole is moved; but the parts in reſpect of one another, becauſe they do not ſeparate one from another, are ſaid to reſt. And on this account

account *motion* is ſaid to be reciprocal, becauſe indeed ſeparation is ſo.

*Philoth.* Then *reſt* and *unſeparateneſs* of parts are all one.

*Cuph.* It ſeems ſo.

*Philoth.* And *unſeparateneſs* and *union* all one.

*Cuph.* The very ſame, I think.

*Philoth.* Why then, *reſt* and *union* are all one, and ſo the principle of the *union* of the parts of matter is the *union* of their parts.

*Hyl.* That is, they have no principle of *union* at all, and therefore of themſelves are diſunited.

*Philoth.* And there is great reaſon they ſhould have none, foraſmuch as they are to be bound together in ſuch forms and meaſures as ſome more *divine* cauſe ſhall order.

*Cuph.* I think in my heart Philotheus and Hylobares have both plotted a conſpiracy together againſt that prince of philoſophers, our admired Des-Cartes.

*Hyl.* Philotheus and I have conſpired in nothing, O Cuphophron, but what ſo noble a philoſopher would commend us for, that is, the free ſearching out of truth: in which I conceive we are not unſucceſsful. For I muſt confeſs I am convinced

that this firſt attribute of matter, as Philotheus has explained it, is true. And for *ſelf-impenetrability*, it is acknowledged of all ſides. But what do you mean, O Philotheus, by *ſelf-inactivity*?

*Philoth.* I mean that matter does not move nor actuate itſelf, but is or has been always excited by ſome other, and cannot modify the motion it is excited into, but moves directly ſo as it is firſt excited, unleſs ſome external cauſe hinder.

*Hyl.* This I underſtand, and doubt not of the truth thereof.

*Cuph.* This is no more than Des-Cartes himſelf allows of.

*Bath.* And good reaſon, O Cuphophron, he ſhould do ſo. For there being no *medium* betwixt *ſelf-activity* and *ſelf-inactivity*, nor betwixt *ſelf-union* and *ſelf-diſunity*, nor any immediate *genus* to theſe diſtributions, as cogitation and figure are to the kinds or modes under them, it is neceſſary that one of the twain, and not an indifferency to either, ſhould be the innate property of ſo ſimple an eſſence as matter: and that therefore *ſelf-inactivity* and *ſelf-diſunity* ſhould be the properties thereof, it being a paſſive principle, and wholly to be guided by another.

*Philoth.* You ſay right, Bathynous; and the

the conſectary from all this will be, That *ſympathy* cannot immediately belong to matter.

*Hyl.* Very likely.

*Philoth.* We are fully agreed then touching the right notion or nature of matter, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* We are ſo, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* Can you then miſs of the true notion of a *ſpirit?*

XXX. The true notion of a ſpirit.

*Hyl.* Methinks I find myſelf able to define it by the rule of contraries. For if *ſelf-diſunity*, *ſelf-inactivity*, *ſelf-impenetrability*, be the eſſential attributes of *matter* or *body*; then the attributes of the oppoſite *ſpecies*, viz. of *ſpirit*, muſt be *ſelf-unity*, *ſelf-activity*, *ſelf-penetrability*.

*Philoth.* Very right. And have you not as diſtinct a notion of every one of theſe attributes as of the other?

*Hyl.* I will try. By the *ſelf-unity* of a ſpirit I underſtand a ſpirit to be *immediately* and *eſſentially one*, and to want no other *vinculum* to hold the parts together but its own eſſence and exiſtence; whence it is of its own nature *indiſcerpible*.

*Philoth.* Excellently well defined.

*Hyl.* This I am carried to by my reaſon. But methinks my imagination boggles

and ſtarts back, and brings me into a ſuſpition that it is the notion of a thing that cannot be. For how can an extended ſubſtance be indiviſible or indiſcerpible? For *quatenus* extended it muſt be diviſible.

*Philoth.* It is true, it is *intellectually* diviſible, but *phyſically* indiſcerpible. Therefore this is the fallacy your fancy puts upon you, that you make *indiviſibility* and *indiſcerpibility* all one. What is *intellectually* diviſible may be *phyſically* indiviſible or indiſcerpible: as it is manifeſt in the nature of God, whoſe very *idea* implies indiſcerpibility, the contrary being ſo plain an imperfection. For whatſoever is diſcerpible is alſo movable: but nothing is movable but muſt be conceived to move in that which is a neceſſary and immovable eſſence, and which will neceſſarily be, tho' there were nothing elſe in the world: which therefore muſt be the holy eſſence of God, as Bathynous has very well noted already, and ſeems to have light upon the true τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον, which Ariſtotle ſought for above the heavens, but Bathynous has rightly found to be every-where. Wherefore at length to make our inference; If it imply a contradiction, Hylobares, that the Divine Extenſion ſhould be diſcerpible,

pible, extended eſſence *quatenus* extended cannot imply *phyſical* diviſibility.

*Hyl.* It is very true, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* What hinders then but ſpirit *quatenus* ſpirit, according to the right *idea* thereof, be *immediately* or *eſſentially one*, that is to ſay, *indiſcerpible*? For what is immediately and eſſentially one, and not *inſtrumentally*, or *one by virtue of ſome other*, is neceſſarily and immutably one, and it implies a contradiction to be otherwiſe, while it at all is, and therefore is *indiſcerpible*.

*Cuph.* Why, Philotheus? cannot the Omnipotence of God himſelf diſcerp a ſpirit, if he has a mind to it?

*Philoth.* He may annihilate a ſpirit, if he will. But if a ſpirit be immediately and eſſentially one, he can no more diſcerp it, than he can ſeparate that property, of having the power of the *hypotenuſa* equal to the powers of both the *baſis* and *cathetus*, from a *rectangle-triangle*.

*Cuph.* You know, Philotheus, Des-Cartes aſſerts that God might change this property of a rectangle-triangle, if he would.

*Philoth.* He does indeed ſay ſo, but by way of a ſlim jear to their ignorance, as he deems it, that are not aware of his ſuppoſed mechanical neceſſity of the reſult of all

the *phænomena* of the world from the mere motion of the matter. This piece of wit I ſuſpect in this paradox of that great Philoſopher. However, I will not contend with you, Cuphophron: Let but a ſpirit be no more diſcerpible than that property of a rectangle-triangle is ſeparable from it, and then we are agreed.

*Cuph.* I am well pleaſed that we can agree in any thing that is compliable with the dictates of the noble Des-Cartes.

*Philoth.* So I dare ſay ſhould we all, O Cuphophron: But I muſt purſue my purpoſe with Hylobares. What do you underſtand by *ſelf-activity* in a ſpirit, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* I underſtand an active power in a ſpirit, whereby it either modifies itſelf according to its own nature, or moves the matter regularly according to ſome certain modifications it impreſſes upon it, uniting the *phyſical monads* into particles of ſuch magnitude and figure, and guiding them in ſuch motions as anſwer the end of the ſpiritual agent, either conceived by it or incorporated into it. Whence there appears, as was ſaid, the reaſon why both *diſunity* and *inactivity* ſhould belong to matter.

*Philoth.* Very accurately and ſuccinctly anſwered, Hylobares. You are ſo nimble at

at it, that certainly you have thought of theſe notions before now.

*Hyl.* I have read ſomething of them. But your dexterous defining the attributes of *matter* might of itſelf make me a little more chearfully nimble at defining thoſe of a *ſpirit*, eſpecially now I can cloſe with the belief of its exiſtence, which I could never do heartily before. And for the laſt Attribute, which ſeemed to me the moſt puzzling, I mean that of *ſelf-penetrability*, it is now to me as eaſy a notion as any: and I underſtand nothing elſe by it, but that different ſpirits may be in the ſame ſpace, or that one and the ſame may draw its extenſion into a leſſer compaſs, and ſo have one part of its eſſence lie in the ſame ſpace with ſome others: by which power it is able to dilate or contract itſelf. This I eaſily conceive may be a property of any created and finite ſpirit, becauſe the extenſion of no ſpirit is corporeal.

*Philoth.* Very true. But did you not obſerve, Hylobares, how I removed *ſympathy* from the capacity of matter?

*Hyl.* I did, Philotheus; and thereby I cannot but collect that it is ſeated in the *ſpiritual* or *incorporeal* nature. And I underſtand by this *ſympathy*, not a mere *compaſſivity*, but rather a *coactivity* of the ſpirit

ſpirit in which it does reſide: which I conceive to be of great uſe in all *perceptive* ſpirits. For in virtue of this attribute, however or in whatever circumſtances they are affected in one part, they are after the ſame manner affected in all. So that if there were a perceptive ſpirit of an infinite Amplitude and of an infinite exaltedneſs of *Sympathy*, where-ever any perceptive Energie emerges in this infinite Spirit, it is ſuddenly and neceſſarily in all of it at once. For I muſt confeſs, Philotheus, I have often thought of theſe notions heretofore, but could never attribute them to a *ſpirit*, becauſe I could not believe there was any ſuch thing as a ſpirit, foraſmuch as all extenſion ſeemed to me to be corporeal. But your æquinoctial arrow has quite ſtruck that error out of my mind. For the more I think of it, the more unavoidable it ſeems to me, that that extenſion in the æquinoctial circle wherein the arrow is carried in a curvilinear motion is not only an extenſion diſtinct from that of the aereal circle, but that it is an extenſion of ſomething real and independent of our imagination. Becauſe the arrow is really carried in ſuch a curvilinear line, and *we not being able to diſ-imagine it otherwiſe*, we have as great a certainty for this as we have for a-

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ny thing. For it is as certainly true as our faculties are true: *and we have no greater certainty than that of our faculties.* And thus was the ſole obſtacle that kept me off from admitting the exiſtence of ſpirits demoliſhed at once by the ſkilful aſſaults of Philotheus.

*Philop.* I am exceeding glad of it, Hylobares, and muſt owe Philotheus many thanks for his ſucceſsful pains. The *Spirituality* of God then is not the leaſt prejudice to your belief of his exiſtence.

*Hyl.* Not the leaſt, Philopolis. The notion of a *ſpirit* is now to me as eaſie and comprehenſible as that of *matter;* and the attributes of a ſpirit infinitely more eaſie than the competibleneſs of ſuch properties as they muſt be forced to give to matter who deny there is any ſuch thing as a ſpirit in the world.

*Philop.* Why then, you may without any more ado proceed to the laſt Attribute of God which you propounded.

XXXI. The Attribute of Omnipreſency.

*Hyl.* I will, Philopolis. It was *Omnipreſency*, I mean the *eſſential* Omnipreſency of God. For attending to the infinite perfection of God according to his *idea*, I cannot but acknowledge his Eſſence to be infinite, and therefore that he is eſſentially preſent

preſent every-where. And for thoſe that would circumſcribe the Divine Eſſence, I would aſk them, how they can make his Eſſence finite, and his Attributes infinite; or to what extent they conceive him circumſcribed. To confine him to a point were intolerably ridiculous. And to pretend that the amplifying of his Eſſence beyond this were any advantage or perfection, were plainly to acknowledge that the taking away his eſſential Omnipreſency is to attribute to him an infinite imperfection. For any circumſcription implies an infinite defect. Theſe conſiderations, O Philopolis, force me to believe that God is eſſentially omnipreſent, and that he pervades all things, even to all infinite imaginable ſpaces. But when I have thus concluded with myſelf, I am caſt off again with a very rude and importune check, as if this were to draw down the Divinity into miry lakes and ditches and worſe-ſcented places, and to be as unmannerly in our thoughts to the true God as Orpheus is in his expreſſions to the Pagan Jupiter,

Ζεῦ κύδιϛε, μέγιϛε θεῶν, εἰλυμένε νόῳ.

*Euiſt.* It is the very verſe that Gregory Nazianzen quotes in his *invectives* againſt *Julian* the *apoſtate*, and does ſeverely reproach

proach the poet for the ſlovenlineſs and unmannerlineſs of his ſtyle.

*Cuph.* And well he may, *Euiſtor.*

*Euiſt.* But how ſhall we redeem our imagination from this captivity into ſuch ſordid conceits?

*Cuph.* I can tell, Euiſtor, and I am very glad of the opportunity of the ſhewing the uſefulneſs of a peculiar notion I have of the *Omnipreſency* of God, to ſolve ſuch difficulties as this of Hylobares.

*Hyl.* For the love of the truth, good Cuphophron, declare it.

*Cuph.* But it is ſo *ſublime*, ſo *ſubtile* and ſo *elevated*, O Hylobares, (tho' not the leſs ſolid) that I queſtion whether it will be diſcretion to commit it to unprepared ears.

*Hyl.* Why? you ſee, Cuphophron, that I am not altogether an undocible auditor of metaphyſicks, by Philotheus his ſucceſs upon me. Beſides, it is againſt the profeſſed freedom of philoſophizing in theſe our meetings to ſuppreſs any thing, and the more injurious, in that you have ſet our mouths a-watering by the mentioning of ſo excellent a notion, and ſo ſerviceable for the ſolving this preſent difficulty touching the Divine Omnipreſence.

*Cuph.* Well, Hylobares, becauſe you do thus

thus forcibly extort it, I will not ſuppreſs my judgment concerning this matter.

*Hyl.* What is it then, dear Cuphophron?

XXXII. Cuphophron's paradox of God's being no-where.

*Cuph.* That *God is no-where*: and therefore neither in miry lakes nor dirty ponds, nor any other ſordid places.

*Hyl.* Ha ha he. Cuphopron, this is a ſubtile ſolution, indeed, to come from one that does, I think, as firmly adhere to the belief of a God as any one in the whole company. If all the Atheiſts in Italy, in England, in Europe, ſhould hear this pious ſolution of thine, they would aſſuredly with one voice cry out, Amen, venerable Cuphophron.

*Cuph.* It is much, Hylobares, the Atheiſts ſhould be ſo univerſally devout.

*Philop.* This ſolution ſeems to me point-blank againſt the very words of ſcripture; *If I climb up into heaven, thou art there; If I deſcend to the bottom of the ſea, thou art there alſo*, and the like. And again, *In him we live and move and have our being.* If we have all this in him, we have it no-where, if he be no-where, nor are we any-where our-ſelves.

*Philoth.* I ſuppoſe that Cuphophron's meaning is, that God is no-where *circumſcriptivé*.

*Cuph.*

*Cuph.* I mean he is no-where *eſſentially*, Philotheus.

*Philoth.* Monſter of opinions!

*Sophr.* The Pythagoreans and Platoniſts, and all the eſtabliſhed religions of the civilized parts of the world, are for the eſſential omnipreſence of God: only Ariſtotle places him on the *primum mobile*; whom Pomponatius, Cardan and Vaninus follow. Nor do I know any other opinion, nor could I imagine any more diviſions touching God's preſence, but of thoſe that would place him at leaſt ſome-where, or elſe of thoſe that would declare him every-where. But now we are come from every-where to ſome-where, and from ſome-where to no-where at all. This is a ſtrain of wit, I ſuppoſe, peculiar to this preſent age.

*Cuph.* It may be ſo, O Sophron. For I think no age within the records of hiſtory has produced more *elevated* wits than this preſent age has done.

*Bath.* I ſuſpect this new conceit, O Cuphophron, of *God's being no-where*, is the waggiſh ſuggeſtion of ſome ſly and ſculking Atheiſts, (with which ſort of people this preſent age abounds) who, upon pretence of extolling the nature of God above the capacity of being ſo much debaſed as to be preſent with any thing that is *extended*, have

thus ſtretched their wits to the outmoſt extent to lift the Deity quite out of the univerſe, they inſinuating that which cannot but imply as much in their own judgments. For it is evident that that which is no-where is not at all. Wherefore it muſt needs make fine fleering ſport with theſe *elevated* wits, while they ſee their ill-intended raillery ſo devoutly taken up for choiceſt and ſublimeſt pieces of natural theology by well-meaning, but leſs cautious, contemplators of philoſophical matters.

*Euiſt.* Is not this ſomething inhoſpital for us all to fall upon Cuphophron thus in his own arbour at once?

*Cuph.* No, Euiſtor, there is nothing committed againſt the laws of hoſpitality, but all tranſacted according to that liberty that is given and often made uſe of in theſe our philoſophical meetings. They are not at all *uncivil*, tho' you be *extremely much a gentleman*, Euiſtor, and it may be, a more favourable eſtimator of my diſtreſſed opinion than the reſt.

*Euiſt.* I muſt confeſs I think none can conceive better of your perſon, Cuphophron, than myſelf; but your aſſertion of *God's being no-where* is the moſt odd and unexpected aſſertion that ever I heard in my life; and, but that you are ſo very well known

known for your piety otherwiſe, I ſhould have thought to have been the voice of a down-right Atheiſt. You will pardon this liberty.

*Cuph.* I told you at firſt, Euiſtor, that the notion was more than ordinarily *ſubtile* and *ſublime:* Theſe things are not apprehended in an inſtant.

XXXIII. The confutation of that paradox.

*Hyl.* Ay but a man may in almoſt leſs than an inſtant diſcover the aſſertion to be impoſſible, ſuppoſing God has any eſſence at all, as Philotheus or Bathynous could quickly convince you.

*Philoth.* The cauſe is in a very good hand; I pray you proceed, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* Tell me then firſt, O Cuphophron, whether God be not as eſſentially preſent every-where as he is any where.

Cuph. That I muſt not deny, Hylobabares: He is.

*Hyl.* And whether his eſſential Attributes be not in his Eſſence, not out of it.

*Cuph.* Who can imagine to the contrary?

*Hyl.* And whether Omnipotency, wherein is contained the power of moving the matter, be not an eſſential Attribute of God.

*Cuph.* That is univerſally acknowledged.

*Hyl.* And that he does or did ſometime move at leaſt ſome part of the matter.

*Cuph.* That Des-Cartes himſelf aſſerts, with whom I am reſolved to ſtand and fall.

*Hyl.* Now I demand, if it be poſſible for the matter to be moved by the power of God, unleſs there be an application of God's power to the matter?

*Cuph.* It is not poſſible, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* Nor the power, being only in the eſſence, not out of it, to be apply'd without the application or preſence of the eſſence to that part of the matter the power acts upon.

*Cuph.* I am ſurpriſed.

*Hyl.* And therefore there being a neceſſity that the Eſſence of God ſhould be preſent to ſome part of the matter at leaſt, according to your own conceſſion, it is preſent to all.

*Cuph.* And ſo I believe you will infer, Hylobares, that the Divine Eſſence is in ſome ſenſe *extended*.

*Hyl.* That indeed, Cuphophron, might be inferred, if need were, that there is an *amplitude* of the Divine Eſſence.

*Bath.* It might; but this in the mean time moſt ſeaſonably noted: How that that atheiſtical plot laid againſt the Exiſtence of God in that bold aſſertion, [That there can be

be no extenſion or amplitude, but it muſt neceſſarily be matter,] being defeated by the notion of the *eſſential Omnipreſence* of God, to make ſure work, and to baffle the truth, they raiſed this *ſublime* and *elevated* fiction, that inſtead of *God's being every-where*, according to the univerſal opinion of all ſober men, that his nature is ſuch that *he can be no-where*: without which far-fetch'd ſubterfuge they could never have born two faces under one hood, and play'd the *Atheiſt* and *Deiſt* at once, profeſſing God was no-where, and yet that he was.

*Cuph.* Is this your ſagacity or deep melancholy, Bathynous, that makes you furmize ſuch plots againſt the Deity? For I have no more plot againſt God, than againſt my own ſoul, which I hold to be a ſpirit. And I hold God to be no-where, not as he is God, but as he is an intellectual ſpirit: for I hold of all ſpirits, that they are no-where.

*Hyl.* It ſeems then, Cuphophron, that the plot aims farther than we thought on, not only to exclude God, but all the orders of ſpirits that are, out of the world.

*Cuph.* I know not what you call excluding out of the *world*, Hylobares; I am ſure I do not mean any excluding out of *being*.

XXXIV. That all ſpirits are ſome-where.

*Hyl.* That is mercifully meant, O Cuphophron; but we cannot conceive they are, if they may not be upon any other terms than you conceit them. And it is a wonder to me, that you do not eaſily diſcern your own ſoul to be *ſome-where*, if you can diſtinctly diſcern her to be at all.

*Cuph.* I do moſt intimately and diſtinctly perceive my own ſoul or mind to be, and that I am it, and yet without being any-where at all.

*Hyl.* But cannot you alſo think of two things at once, O Cuphophron?

*Cuph.* Every man can do that that can compare two things or two *idea's* one with the other: For if he do not think of them at once, how can he compare them?

*Hyl.* Let not go therefore this perception you have of yourſelf, but raiſe up alſo the *idea* or remembrance of the indefinitely extended matter of the univerſe, which is diſ-continued no-where, but reaches from *yourſelf* to infinite ſpaces round about you, or is continued from infinite ſpaces round about till it reach your thinking *ſelfſhip*. Can you be ſurrounded by all this, and yet be no-where? Or can you compare your diſtinct *ſelfſhip* with this immenſe compaſs, and yet not conceive yourſelf ſurrounded?

*Cuph.*

*Cuph.* I compare what is no-where with that which is every-where, and find them to be ἀσύμβλητα.

*Hyl.* You ſuppoſe your mind or ſoul no-where firſt, or rather ſay ſo, tho' you cannot conceive it, and then you cry out that the univerſe and ſhe are ἀσύμβλητα. Which error, if you were unprejudiced, this conſideration would convince you of, eſpecially back'd with what palpably falls under ſenſe.

*Cuph.* What's that, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* The ſoul's being touch'd and tranſfix'd, as it were, from real objects *ab extra* round about, from above and beneath, and from every ſide: which would be notoriouſly perceptible to you, if you could pearch yourſelf, as a bird, on the top of ſome high ſteeple.

*Cuph.* It is more ſafe to ſuppoſe the experiment, than to try it. But what then, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* There being from above and beneath and from every ſide round from thoſe external objects (ſuppoſe of ſight) motion tranſmitted to the perceptive ſoul herſelf through the air and organs of her body, and ſhe palpably perceiving herſelf thus affected from things round about her,

it

it is manifeſt from thence that ſhe is in the midſt of them, according as ſhe plainly feels herſelf to be, and that conſequently ſhe is *ſome-where*.

*Euph.* That which is no-where cannot be in the midſt of any things. It is only the body that is in the midſt of thoſe objects, which obtrudes this miſtake upon the ſoul, while ſhe thinks herſelf to be in the midſt of them, whenas indeed ſhe is not.

*Hyl.* But the body with all its organs, and thoſe more external *media* betwixt the body and the objects, are but the inſtruments whereby the ſoul perceives thoſe diſtant objects round about. Wherefore ſhe herſelf muſt needs be where the lines of motion through theſe continued inſtruments of her perception do concenter. Nay indeed the tranſmiſſion of any ſingle motion through matter that affects the ſoul is a palpable argument that ſhe is ſome-where. For how can that which is ſome-where, as matter and motion are, reach that which is no-where? How can they come at it, or it at them? Not to add, that Des-Cartes * himſelf expreſſly admits that thoſe objects the ſoul ſees and flies from or purſues are without her. Wherefore many of theſe in a compaſs muſt needs ſurround her, and there-

* Princ. part. 1. art. 71.

therefore they being without her, ſhe muſt be within them, and ſo of neceſſity be *ſomewhere*.

*Cuph.* The Philoſopher, it may be, there ſlips into the ordinary conceit of the vulgar.

*Hyl.* Again, Cuphophron, if the ſouls of men be no-where, they are as much in one man's body as another's, and one man's ſoul may move another man's body as well as his own, and at what-ever diſtance that man is from them: which ſeems impoſſible for any finite ſpirit to do, nor are there any examples of their doing ſo.

*Cuph.* You give the reaſon yourſelf, Hylobares, why they cannot act at any diſtance; namely, becauſe their power is finite.

*Hyl.* And you Cuphophron, acknowledge ſouls to be nearer and farther off, in that you acknowledge they cannot act at any diſtance. But that which is nearer and farther off is ſome-where, at leaſt *definitivé*.

*Cuph.* And that one man's ſoul does not move another man's body, is becauſe it is vitally united only to one.

*Hyl.* Is it then united to the inſide of the body, Cuphophron, or to the outſide?

*Cuph.* That is a captious queſtion. For whether I ſay to the inſide or to the outſide, you will infer the ſoul to be ſomewhere.

where. But that which is no-where cannot be united to either ſide.

*Hyl.* And therefore is not united at all.

*Cuph.* Theſe things will not fall into every man's capacity.

*Hyl.* Again, Cuphophron, is the ſoul united to the body by its eſſence, or by ſome eſſential attribute of the ſoul?

*Cuph.* There is another caption, Hylobares: for I foreſee your ſophiſtry, that if I ſay the *eſſence* of the ſoul is united with the body, then the ſoul muſt be where the body is. But if I ſay by an *eſſential attribute*, the ſoul muſt be where the eſſential attribute is, and conſequently where the body is: ſo that it will come all to one.

*Hyl.* Or thus, Cuphophron, Does not the ſoul move the body?

*Cuph.* What moves the bodies of brutes, Hylobares? Is not their ſoul mere mechanical motion, according to that admirable philoſopher?

*Hyl.* But I aſk you, does not the rational ſoul by the power of its will move the body?

*Cuph.* Elſe there were no exerciſe of free-will in external actions?

*Hyl.* Is then the power of moving the body thus by her will in the ſoul, or out of the ſoul?

*Cuph.*

*Cuph.* In the ſoul, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* How then can this power be exerted on the body to move it, unleſs the ſoul be eſſentially preſent to the body to exert it upon it?

*Cuph.* By a certain *emanative efficacy* that comes from the ſoul.

*Hyl.* And flows like a ſtreamer in the air betwixt the ſoul and the body.

*Cuph.* You run always into theſe *extenſional* phantaſms, Hylobares, the buſie importunities of which, when I am rapt up into my *metaphyſical ſublimities*, I look as contemptuouſly down upon, as upon the quick wrigglings up and down of Piſmires and Ear-wigs upon the *extended* ſurface of the earth.

*Hyl.* You have a very *elevated* ſoul, I muſt confeſs, O Cuphophron. But I pray you look down a little lower and cloſer on this *emanative energy* of the ſoul upon the body, and purſue it from the body to the ſource of it, the ſoul, where ends it, Cuphophron?

*Cuph.* In the ſoul, Hylobares.

*Hyl.* But where is then the ſoul?

*Cuph.* No-where.

*Hyl.* Why then it ends no-where, and began from no-where.

*Cuph.* That muſt needs be, becauſe the ſoul is no-where.

*Hyl.*

*Hyl.* But this is marvelouſly myſterious, O Cuphophron, that there ſhould be a continued emanation betwixt two things, whereof one is ſome-where, and yet the other no-where; the intermediate *emanation* alſo proceeding but to a finite diſtance.

Cuph. *Metaphyſicks* were not *Metaphyſicks*, Hylobares, if they were not myſterious.

*Hyl.* Had you not better admit of an immaterial or metaphyſical extenſion with Philotheus and myſelf, than to harbour ſuch unconceivable notions, that ly ſo unevenly in every man's mind but your own?

*Cuph.* I am not alone of this mind, Hylobares. And as for Philotheus his opinion and yours, (ſince you have adopted it) I have heard what has been ſaid all this while, and have thought of theſe things over and over again, but your reaſons move me nothing at all.

XXXV. The grounds of Cuphophron's paradox (that ſpirits are no-where) produced and examined.

*Hyl.* Tell me then, I pray you, Cuphophron, what is it chiefly that moved you to be of the opinion that you are, *That no ſpirit can be any-where*, or that the ſoul of man is *no-where*?

*Cuph.* O Hylobares, there be convincing reaſons of this ſeeming paradox, if they meet

meet with a mind capable of them: but the chief are theſe two. Firſt, In that the mind of man thinks of ſuch things as are no-where, as of many *moral*, *logical* and *mathematical* truths, which being of the nature to be no-where, the mind that conceives them muſt be neceſſarily no-where alſo. The ſecond, In that *cogitation*, as cogitation, is *ipſo facto* exempted or preſcinded from all extenſion. For tho' we doubt whether there be any matter or any extended thing in the world, yet we are even then aſſured that we are *res cogitantes*. Which ſhews that *cogitation* has nothing at all to do with *extenſion*, nor has any *applicability* to it; foraſmuch as we perceive ourſelves to think, when we have not the leaſt thought of any thing extended. Wherefore our thoughts having no *relation* or *applicability* to extenſion, they have no applicability to place, and conſequently neither they nor our minds are any-where.

*Hyl.* I partly underſtand what you would be at, Cuphophron, but not ſo fully as to diſcover any ſtrength at all in your reaſonings. The weakneſs of the firſt ground you may underſtand from hence; That it will as well follow, that the ſoul or mind of man is ſome-where, becauſe it thinks of things that are ſome-where, as that it is no-

where, becauſe it thinks of things that are no-where. Beſides that thoſe things which you ſay are no-where are ſome-where, I mean thoſe *moral*, *logical* and *mathematical* truths. For they are in the mind or ſoul; and the ſoul I before demonſtrated, I think, to any unprejudiced auditor, to be in the body, and the body you cannot deny but to be ſome-where. It is true, ſome of thoſe truths, it may be, as they are *repreſentations*, reſpect neither time nor place; but as they are *operations* or *modes* of a *ſubject* or *ſubſtance*, they cannot but be conceived to be in that ſubſtance. And foraſmuch as there is no ſubſtance but has at leaſt an *eſſential amplitude*, they are in a ſubſtance that is in ſome ſort extended, and ſo by virtue of their ſubject muſt neceſſarily be conceived to be ſome-where. For the mode of a thing is inſeparate from the thing itſelf.

*Cuph.* But here you run away with that, Hylobares, which I will not allow you to aſſume, *viz.* That there is a ſubſtance of the mind or ſoul diſtinct from *cogitation*. I ſay that *cogitation* itſelf is the very ſubſtance of the ſoul, and therefore the ſoul is as much no-where as if it had no ſubſtance at all.

*Hyl.* But obſerve, Cuphophron, that in your ſaying that *cogitation* itſelf is the very

ry *ſubſtance* of the ſoul, you affirm the ſoul is a ſubſtance. And ſo my argument returns again upon you; tho' the ſaying the *very operation* is the ſubſtance is a manifeſt falſhood. For the operations of the ſoul are ſpecifically diſtinct, and ſuch ſpecifically diſtinct operations ſucceeding one another muſt be, according to your account, ſo many ſpecifical ſubſtances ſucceeding one another. So that your ſoul would not be always the ſame *ſpecifical ſubſtance*, much leſs the ſame *individual*; than which nothing can be more wild and extravagant. Again, the ſoul is accounted a *permanent thing* by all men, but her operations are in *flux* and *ſucceſſion*: how then can the operations be the ſoul herſelf? or what will become of memory? There is therefore, O Cuphophron, a ſubſtance of the ſoul as diſtinct from its operations or ſucceeding cogitations, as the matter is from the figures and motions that ſucceed in it.

*Cuph.* I am not yet convinced of that.

*Hyl.* And now for your ſecond ground, which would infer from our being aſſured we *think*, while we doubt whether there be any extended thing in the world, or, it may be, think of no extenſion, that therefore our minds have no *relation* or *applicability* to any extenſion whatſoever; The weakneſs

weakneſs of this reaſoning you may eaſily diſcover, if you will but conſider, That intenſion of heat or motion is conſidered without any relation to extenſion, and yet it is related to a ſubject extended, ſuppoſe to a burning-hot iron. And we think without at all thinking of time or of the courſe of the ſun; and yet our thought is applicable to time, and by the motion of the ſun may definitively be ſaid not to have commenced till ſuch a minute of an hour, and to have ceaſed by ſuch a minute. And there is the ſame reaſon of place as of time, that is to ſay, ſuch a man's thoughts may be ſaid definitively to have been conceived in ſuch a place, as well as within ſuch a time. And, to conclude, it ſeems a mere ſophiſm, to argue from the preciſion of our thoughts, that the things themſelves are really preſcinded one from another; and it is yet far worſe, to infer they have not any relation or applicability one to another. If they were ſo unrelated indeed in the full and adequate apprehenſion of them, as well circumſtantial as eſſential, then I confeſs the inference might be ſound: but when the mind is ſo ſet-on the metaphyſical rack as to pull thoſe things aſunder that are found together in nature, and then to ſay they have no relation to one another, or to leave

leave out by inadvertency what cannot be excluded from the perfect *idea* of ſuch or ſuch a being; all concluſions from ſuch principles muſt be like the principles themſelves, defective or diſtorted. And therefore, being ſo little ſatisfied with Cuphophron's ſolution of the preſent difficulty touching the *Divine Omnipreſence*, I foreſee that Philotheus muſt have the ſole honour of fully eaſing and ſettling my mind in a right and rational apprehenſion of all the Attributes of God.

*Philoth.* The honour of that ſatisfaction is due to God alone, Hylobares, who has given you ſo quick an apprehenſion, and ſo impartial a love of the truth, where-ever it is found.

*Hyl.* That honour I do unfeignedly render to God that is his peculiar due; and yet I think there is a civil gratitude due alſo to thoſe that he vouchſafes to make inſtruments of his goodneſs and bounty, as he has at this time made you, Philotheus. And therefore you having had ſo excellent ſucceſs hitherto, I deſire you would proceed to the ſolution of this laſt difficulty, touching the *Divine Omnipreſence*.

XXXVI. That God is eſſentially preſent everywhere.

*Philoth.* I will, Hylobares, and I believe

you will find it one of the eaſieſt you have propounded, tho' I muſt confeſs it may ſeem odd at the firſt ſight, as it has done to very famous criticks in points of theology, who mainly from this conſideration, that the foul and ill-ſcented places of the earth are an unfit receptacle of the divine Preſence, have made bold to confine the Godhead to the heavens. Which opinion of theirs is rather to be imputed to the nicety of their ſenſe than to the ſagacity of their wit. For all thoſe things that ſeem ſo foul and diſagreeable in nature are not *really* ſo in themſelves, but only *relatively*; and what is one creature's *poiſon* is the *delight* and *food* of another, and what is the *death* of the one is the *life* of the other. So that we may eaſily conceive, tho' God has an apprehenſion of whatever is, that yet there is no neceſſity at all that he ſhould be diſaffected, diſguſted, or any way annoyed by being preſent with any thing: nay, rather, that it is impoſſible he ſhould, every thing that implies imperfection being incompetible to the Divine Eſſence; ſo that he need not withdraw himſelf from it, he ſuffering nothing by immediately reſiding in it, no more than he can be *wounded* with a *ſword* or *prick'd* with a *thorn*; and there is the like reaſon for any other ingrateful

ſenſe.

ſenſe. For all is to be reſolved into the *motion* and *figure* of the *particles* of the *matter* variouſly impreſſed upon the organs of our bodies: and what unholineſs or abſolute defilement can there be in any either *motion*, *figure*, or *exility* of ſuch *particles*? Wherefore the frame of all natural things whatſoever, nothing at all excepted, is no leſs *inoffenſive*, no leſs *holy*, no leſs *agreeable* to the *Eternal Mind*, than the lines of a picture or ſtatue are to a limner or ſtatuary, no part whereof gives him the leaſt diſguſt or averſation from the matter he has thus ſhaped or figured; for *art* and *ſkill* and *reaſon* runs through all. Whence it appears that this exception againſt the Omnipreſence of God is nothing but a fallacy put upon our own inadvertent thoughts, while we fancy God liable to the ſame inconveniencies that we ourſelves are by reaſon of our weak and paſſive ſenſes.

*Philop.* This ſeems to me, tho' leſs verſed in philoſophy, a very plain, ſolid and intelligible ſolution of the preſent difficulty. But Cuphopron's hypotheſis is, I muſt confeſs, to my ſlower apprehenſion infinitely paradoxical, and methought was very intelligibly confuted by Hylobares, tho' with ſome circumſtances that to me ſeemed

not

not ſo becoming toward ſo worthy and obliging a perſon as Cuphophron.

XXXVII. The Arboriſt's affected liberty of diſſenting in unneceſſary opinions and friendly abuſiveneſs of one another in their philoſophical meetings.

*Cuph.* I thank you, Philopolis, for your ſenſibleneſs on my behalf. But in conteſt he ordinarily looks as if he were abuſed who is thought to be overcome. Beſides, it is an uſual thing in our meetings, and to which we are much inured who are ſo familiarly acquainted, to abuſe one another into the truth, by ſhewing the ridiculouſneſs of the error, and intimating from what diſproportion of temper of mind it may ariſe. For this ſubderiſorious mirth is ſo far from giving any offence to us who underſtand one another, that it is rather a pleaſant condiment of our converſation, and makes our ſerious diſcourſes the leſs tedious to ourſelves, and, I think, ſometimes not the more ungrateful to ſtrangers, when they underſtand that there is not the leaſt enmity under it.

*Philoth.* That ſolicitude, Philopolis, which you ſeem to have for the excuſing of Hylobares, we on the other ſide, I think, ought to have in the behalf of Cuphophron,

phophron, who was not at all behind-hand with him in any jocant wit or humour.

*Cuph.* I confeſs it, in that ſenſe I have already explained unto Philopolis.

*Philop.* You paſs away your time in a marvellous way of pleaſantry and innocency, O Cuphophron, while thoſe things which may ſeem blemiſhes elſewhere are truly the badges of virtue and good nature amongſt you. But it is much that, there being ſo great conſent of affection and friendſhip amongſt you, there is not likewiſe the ſame conſent of opinion.

*Cuph.* That is a thing we do not ſo much as affect, unleſs it be in thoſe things that are neceſſary for proficiency in piety and virtue.

*Philop.* Are then the opinions of *God's being no-where* and of *his being every-where* alike conducive to virtue and piety?

*Cuph.* Yes, Philopolis, if they be rightly underſtood. For he that ſays that God is no-where, holds notwithſtanding that his Providence and protective preſence is every-where. So that it is no diſcouragement to virtue and true piety. Wherefore the caſe ſtands thus betwixt Hylobares and myſelf. He has a great zeal againſt my opinion of God's being no-where, for fear it ſhould be thence inferr'd that there is no God

God at all: and I have as great a zeal for my opinion, becauſe if I acknowledge God any-where, I muſt acknowledge him *extended*, and to me it is all one to acknowledge an *extended* God, and no God at all. For whatever is extended, is either matter, or as uncapable of cogitation or perception as matter itſelf. For if any entire thing, any form or figure be perceived by what is extended, nothing in the extended *percipient* perceives the whole, but only part. Which is a ſign that our own ſouls are not extended, much leſs the Eſſence of God. But I will not renew the diſpute.

*Philop.* I am ſurpriſed with an unexpected ſubtilty of Cuphophron's: how will you reſcue me, Hylobares?

*Hyl.* Very eaſily. Do you not remember the notion of *ſympathy*, Philopolis, in virtue whereof whatever the leaſt real point of the Eſſence of the *perceptive* part of the ſoul, ſuppoſe, does perceive, every real point of the *perceptive* muſt perceive at once?

*Philop.* I partly underſtand you, Hylobares: but now I ſee you ſo good at theſe notions, we will diſcourſe ſome time more fully of them at my houſe. In the mean time I think you cannot but be fully ſatisfy'd with Philotheus his ſolution of this laſt difficulty

ficulty touching the Divine Omnipreſence.

*Hyl.* Very fully.

*Philop.* And I am abundantly pleaſed with the conſideration, that the widely-different apprehenſions betwixt you and Cuphophron touching God's Omnipreſence, meet together and join ſo ſtrongly in one common zealous deſign of turning off whatever may ſeem to ſupplant his exiſtence.

*Hyl.* I believe it is a great ſatisfaction to us both.

XXXVIII. The concluſion.

*Philop.* But I triumph in nothing ſo much as that Philotheus has ſo throughly convinced you, that there is nothing in all the Divine Attributes ſo intricate as to hinder your cloſing heartily with the belief of a God.

*Hyl.* There is nothing, I thank God and Philotheus, in all thoſe Attributes we have hitherto conſidered that ſeems not extremely much more eaſy than any other *hypotheſis* that ever yet came into my mind. But there is a main Attribute behind, which is the *goodneſs* of God, the notion whereof tho' it be not hard to conceive, yet to make the *phænomena* of the world and the paſſages of providence conſtantly to comport with it, I foreſee may prove a very great difficulty.

*Philop.*

*Philop.* This therefore is the *ſecond obſtacle*, Hylobares, you at * firſt mentioned.

*Hyl.* It is ſo.

*Philoth.* And I fear will be too copious a ſubject to be entred upon at this time.

*Philop.* I conceive ſo too. And beſides, I have ſome letters to diſpatch by the poſt this night, which I muſt not neglect. *For we may rectify our inward thoughts ſo ſoon as we find our error; but if any error or neglect be committed in outward affairs, tho' the error be diſcovered, the loſs is many times irrecoverable, and the inconvenience incorrigible.*

*Cuph.* That is very true. But, according to the ancient cuſtom of Athens, you have a right, Philopolis, as well of putting an end to as beginning the diſpute.

*Philop.* This law was undoubtedly an intended civility by your anceſtors, O Cuphophron, but in this circumſtance of things I look upon it as a piece of cruelty; that I muſt do execution upon myſelf, and by mine own act deprive myſelf of that ingenuous converſe which I could enjoy with pleaſure even to break of day.

*Cuph.* It is the common loſs of us all, eſpecially mine, who enjoy myſelf nowhere ſo well as in ſo excellent company. But

† *Sect.* 14.

But it is in your hand, Philopolis, to remedy this: for you have the right of appointing the time of our meeting again, as well as of diſſolving this preſent meeting.

*Philop.* Have I ſo? This makes amends for the other misfortune, which I will repair by a more timely appointment. I adjourn therefore this meeting till to-morrow at five a clock in the afternoon, if Philotheus and the reſt be agreed.

*Philoth.* Agreed.

*The End of the firſt Dialogue.*